February 7, 2012

Bank Not Liable In Nigerian-Style Email Scam

Question: When a bank sues to recover an overdraft created by a Nigerian-style email scam, which party has the burden of proof on the question of whether, in the context of section 3406 of the Commercial Code, the bank acted negligently—the bank or the overdraft account holder?

Answer: The account holder, according to the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, in Chino Commercial Bank, N.A. vs. Peters (E049170), decided May 25, 2010.

Oddly enough, this scheme still works sometimes.

Appellant Brian Peters agreed to a proposal that his corporation would receive money supposedly owed to an individual in Malaysia and then pay the money out as directed in exchange for a 15% fee. His corporation received over $800,000 and deposited them in an account at Chino Commercial Bank. The company then had the Bank pay out $468,000. Thereafter, all the checks the company deposited bounced and created an overdraft.

The Bank filed suit against the corporation and Peters (who had signed the account agreement rendering him liable for any account shortage) and obtained a right to attach order against Peters. Ruling for the Bank, the trial court concluded that under section 3406 of the Commercial Code, Peters had the burden of proving the Bank was negligent (which he had not done). It also expressed concern that Peters, despite being negligent himself, "then looks to the bank and says, 'you should have prevented me from doing that.'"

The court of appeal affirmed. It began its analysis by quoting subdivision (a) of section 3406, which states that, "a person whose failure to exercise ordinary care contributes to an alteration of an instrument or to the making of a forged signature on an instrument is precluded from asserting the alteration or the forgery against a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or for collection." The court held that it was undisputed the Bank was a "person who, in good faith, pa[id] the instrument or t[ook] for value or for collection." The court noted that in this context, "good faith" simply means that the Bank "acted honestly and in accordance with 'reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.'"

Next, the court of appeal noted there was "ample evidence" that Peters failed to exercise ordinary care and thus contributed to the alteration of the checks. (Indeed, Peters conceded that he was "less than smart in moving forward on the transaction.…") Under subdivision (b) of section 3406, however, if the Bank, too, failed to exercise ordinary care in a way that contributed to the loss, the loss "must be allocated between the Bank and Peters." Citing subdivision (c) of the statute, the court of appeal held that Peters had the burden of proving the Bank was negligent—the Bank was not required to prove it was not negligent. Concluding he had not come close to doing so, the court affirmed the right to attach order.

Copyright © 2012, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

About the Author

Partner

Bob Stumpf is a partner in the firm's San Francisco office and serves as leader of the firm's Financial Institutions Litigation team.
 

415-774-3288

Boost: AJAX core statistics

Legal Disclaimer

You are responsible for reading, understanding and agreeing to the National Law Review's (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC's  Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free to use, no-log in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.  

Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. NLR does not accept advertising from attorneys or law firms. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com  intended to be an advertisement or a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional.  NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us. 

Under certain state laws the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.