Advertisement

May 20, 2013

Fair Use Analysis for E-Reserves and Course Management Systems

On Friday, May 11, 2012, the long-awaited decision in Cambridge University Press v. Becker et al. was released by Judge Orinda Evans.  In that case, several academic publishers sued four administrators at Georgia State University over the practice of putting class readings on electronic reserve and course management systems. The administrators did not seek permission or pay fees to the publishers after claiming a “fair use” exemption from copyright law. In the past, professors would often make a small number of physical copies of articles or book chapters available for students in the library, and the copies were made with permission from the publishers for a reproduction fee. Alternatively, the professor would create a “course pack” of articles and excerpts, which also required obtaining permission from each publisher and paying a fee. This important decision provides a clear test to determine fair use under copyright law in the digital age.

The decision has been considered a major win for Georgia State specifically, and for libraries more generally, providing a type of safe harbor for fair use of books on e-reserve. Judge Evans used the four statutory fair use factors as the framework of her analysis and applied that to each of the challenged postings. Notably, over one-third of the postings did not make it to the fair use analysis because either (1) the publishers were unable to prove that they owned the copyright in the challenged readings; or (2) Judge Evans found that merely putting infringing material in a system, without proof of use (i.e. student downloads), is not enough to establish liability. 

Before evaluating each of the challenged uses, Judge Evans provided a general analysis of the application of each of the four fair use factors to the e-reserve or course management system context. It is this analysis that is gaining the most attention from the decision as it weighs in favor of the institution and will likely be used by other institutions in the future.  Judge Evans’ analysis was as follows:

Factor One: Purpose and Character of the Use will strongly favor libraries and non-profit educational users in every analysis because it is the type of use intended to be covered by the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act.

Factor Two: Nature of Copyrighted Work will generally favor the university in each instance because the works at issue were scholarly non-fiction which, the Judge noted, is more informational than creative and thus has a broader scope of fair use.

Factor Three: Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used favors the university only if they used no more than 10% of works with ten chapters or less, or one chapter for books with more than ten chapters, and the portion is not “the heart of the work”.

Factor Four: Effect of the Use on the Potential Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work will strongly favor the publisher in every analysis as long as there is a reasonably priced, readily available license specifically for digital excerpts, though Judge Evans noted that permissions fees are not a significant part of a publisher’s overall revenue.

Since the first two factors will always weigh in favor of nonprofit educational users of non-fiction works, if the institution can win on either of the other two factors, the use will be fair. 

While Judge Evans has yet to order any relief, asking both parties to suggest appropriate relief, including language for an injunction, it can be expected that the publishers will appeal this ruling. 

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

About the Author

Partner Ariana G. Voigt Michael Best Friedrich
Partner

Ariana Voigt is a partner in the Intellectual Property Practice Group. Ms. Voigt concentrates her practice in the fields of trademarks, copyrights, false advertising and unfair competition, including trademark enforcement, international and domestic trademark prosecution, trademark clearance searching, licensing and transactional due diligence issues.

414-225-4928

Boost: AJAX core statistics

Legal Disclaimer

You are responsible for reading, understanding and agreeing to the National Law Review's (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC's  Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free to use, no-log in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.  

Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. NLR does not accept advertising from attorneys or law firms. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com  intended to be an advertisement or a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional.  NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us. 

Under certain state laws the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.