The elderly population is often a target for those who seek their financial resources—from identity theft, to telemarketing schemes, to health care fraud. The elderly population is seen by many in society as a vulnerable group as a whole; this is often because some in the elderly population may be suffering from dementia or other ailments that may cloud those individuals’ memories. Knowledge about how dementia affects an elderly person’s abilities to recall events or fully orient himself can create predatory opportunities for those who wish to take advantage of this common illness. Those who prey on the elderly likely believe the elder has a substantial amount of money and would easily fall for scams. One area of concern involving fraud against and involving the elderly is fraud in prescription drugs, specifically Medicare Part D.
Medicare Part D, implemented in 2006, came into being under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 [hereinafter “MMA”]. The MMA provided assistance for paying for prescription drugs for some elderly persons as before Part D, Medicare only covered prescriptions issued from a hospital or doctor’s office. As long as one is eligible for Medicare Parts A or Part B, he is eligible for the optional prescription drug plan, Medicare Part D.
Like Medicare Parts A and B, Part D is administered through the federal government, but unlike A and B, the actual prescription services are delivered through various approved private insurers. There are two types of Medicare Part D Plans: Prescription Drug Plans (PDP) and Medicare Advantage Plans (MA-PD). PDPs only provide prescription coverage while MA-PDs also provide the medical services that Medicare Part A and B provide, but through a private company.
For Medicare eligible elders with a more limited income, the Low or Limited Income Subsidy, or Extra Help, is available to assist with some or all of Part D prescription costs. A major benefit of the Extra Help program is that these recipients do not have to face the coverage gap, or “doughnut hole,” that comes with most Part D plans. For an elderly individual or couple who do not apply for the Extra Help subsidy, the “doughnut hole” is a certain spending point, $3,6100.00 in 2010 and $2,480.00 in 2011, after which the elderly individual is responsible for paying for the full costs of his prescription medications. After the individual reaches a second spending benchmark—$4,550.00 in prescription drug costs for 2011—catastrophic coverage will be triggered. During catastrophic coverage, the individual will pay for only 5% of drug costs.
To assist with these difficult costs to the elderly, the Patient and Affordable Care Act [hereinafter PPACA] implements a plan for the hole to “close” in 2020. The closure of the doughnut hole means that the individual will be responsible for paying for only 25% of his prescription costs for brand-name drugs, as 50% will be covered by the pharmaceutical company and 25% by a federal subsidy and 25% for name brands. The program starts the closure of the hole gradually, as it began in 2011 with a 50% discount for brand-name prescription medications and a 7% discount for generic prescription medications. Despite the discount programs and forthcoming changes to the Medicare system, the costs of prescription drugs are still a concern and a major financial burden for many elderly people.
With the coming of the Part D program in 2006, some were concerned about the new and extended avenue for fraud—particularly against the elderly. When Part D first began, many predicted a dreary future for Part D, fraught with fraud, a plan some predicted to cause more trouble than it was worth. Along with fraud related to billing, predictions included “enrollment based frauds, improper inducements to enroll, formulary manipulations, acceptance by plans or pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) of improper inducements from manufacturers to have their drugs on formulary, improper reporting to the government of rebates received from manufacturers, and plan marketing programs.”
Similarly, telemarketers and internet scammers may target the elderly who may not be as wary or meticulous in protecting their information and checking the legitimacy of the programs. Elderly persons may find themselves enrolled in a Part D program with a premium that is too high for their income or one that excludes the prescription drugs they need from coverage. While Medicare Part D was implemented five years ago, these concerns have not diminished. While it is clear that such concerns have materialized, it is less clear how pervasive the fraud has become.
The MMA requires Part D providers to implement a program to protect against fraud and other abuses of Medicare Part D. While the Center for Medicaid & Medicare Services has its own lengthy suggestions, for the most part, each Part D plan is supposed to implement its fraud and abuse prevention through use of its own guidelines. Some opine that flexibility for insurers to choose how to set up and implement their fraud, waste, and abuse monitoring programs provides a structure that “remains ripe for abuse” by these Part D insurers.
One part of the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services goals to reduce fraud in Part D is the implementation of the Medicare Drug Integrity Contractors program, or MEDICs, which “identif[y] and investigat[e] potential Part D fraud and abuse, develo[p] potential Part D fraud or abuse cases for referral to law enforcement agencies, ac[t] as a liaison to law enforcement, and serv[e] as an auditor of Sponsor and subcontractor Part D operations.” MEDICs collect and investigate the kind of internal fraud that the Part D beneficiary may never be made aware of—such as submission of false claims for services not provided.
The MEDICs rely heavily on reporting of potential fraud and abuse to their agency through complaints. These complaints may come from the elderly individual himself or they can be reported by family members, healthcare providers, and other Medicare plans. MEDICs are also supposed to complete their own internal analysis of potential fraud through “fulfilling requests for information from law enforcement agencies. . .; identifying program vulnerabilities; auditing the fraud, waste, and abuse programs that are part of plan sponsors’ compliance plans.”
MEDICS are also supposed to apply internal methods of fraud and abuse analysis through “analyzing claims data, conducting Internet searches to identify leads, and analyzing complaint data for trends” but this internal investigation has been limited. Out of the 4,194 reports of potential fraud or abuse in 2008, 87% of these were reported from outside, non-MEDIC, sources. For the cases identified through internal research, 93%, or 553 cases, were discovered through analyzing data trends. Once MEDICs determine that the report of fraud and abuse may have legitimacy, they open an investigation. Out of the 4,194 reports in 2008, 1,320 of these cases were investigated. For the cases that the MEDICs chose to investigate, the MEDICs referred sixty-five cases to the Office of the Inspector General and sent thirty-four “immediate advisements” to the Office of the Inspector General as well. For the remaining cases, 257 were referred to state insurance commissioners and the final 39 were sent to CMS for review.
While all of cases that come before the MEDICs are reviewed, not all are investigated. The MEDICs decide to complete an investigation where they find that the subject of their investigation “engaged in a pattern of improper prescription writing or billing, submitted improper claims with actual knowledge of their falsity, or submitted improper claims with reckless disregard or deliberate ignorance of their truth or falsity.” The way that the investigations are completed is through a case review. If after the MEDICs’ investigatory efforts, they determine potential fraud or abuse, the MEDICs are supposed to seek the assistance of the Office of the Inspector General to decide what should be done. However, regardless of whether cases are referred for further investigation, the MEDICs are required to update CMS monthly with all referrals to outside agencies and their status.
Out of the 1,320 cases investigated in 2008, 40% of identified fraud involved marketing schemes. The marketing schemes involved behaviors ranging from unsolicited door-to-door marketing to individuals to enrolling an elderly individual in a plan without his permission. While the MEDICs report does not specify its definition of “permission,” it is likely that such tactics would include enrolling an individual who may say he agrees, but who does not have the capacity to enroll himself in a Plan without permission of that individual’s guardian or health care proxy. Twenty-one percent of cases involved “drug diversion by beneficiaries” and 15% involved inappropriate prescriptions, or billing for drugs not medically needed.
While the MEDIC program appears to be organized and comprehensive from the outside, the MEDICs are limited in their ability to track and prevent Part D fraud. The three national MEDICs programs reported that the limitations on their authority to access data as well as audit Plan sponsors limited their ability to enforce their mission of identifying and monitoring potential fraud and abuse. For instance, as of 2008, the MEDICs could not gain access to much of the information they needed to complete their reports, as they were required to request information from the plan sponsors and could not receive this data from CMS directly.
One other troubling finding from the MEDIC analysis is that plan sponsors are not required to refer identified cases of potential fraud to the MEDICs. Thus, the information that the MEDICs received is what the Part D plans voluntarily provided and so the breadth of the MEDICs investigations were limited by the amount of data they could collect. Perhaps “encouragement” is not sufficient to convince Part D plans to report concerns of fraud and abuse; the Office of the Inspector General suggests mandatory reporting to MEDICs, rather than recommended reporting so that the MEDICs will be made privy to a greater amount of incidents and will subsequently be able to provide greater protection against such fraud.
Beyond the legal or budgetary limitations of the MEDIC programs, some still do not feel that Medicare’s plan for protecting the elderly population against fraud and abuse in Part D programs is sufficient. In one instance of Part D fraud, seventy-four-year-old Mr. Aldridge’s Medicare Part D plan was switched to a Medicare Advantage plan after a Part D plan employee forged Mr. Aldrige’s signature to enroll him. Mr. Aldrige’s doctors did not accept this new healthcare plan. The unapproved switch cost Mr. Aldrige hundreds of thousands of dollars in out –of-pocket prescription drug costs before the problem was straightened out—while the salesman who allegedly committed the forgery that devastated Mr. Aldrige received a $300.00 commission for Mr. Aldrige’s enrollment. Unfortunately, Mr. Aldrige’s story is not unique, there exist horror stories of people and plans who will enroll elderly individuals who lack capacity to contract, who were not proficient in English, those whose life-sustaining medications are not actually covered by the plan, or by garnering enrollment by marketing in a way that the elderly may wrongfully believe that Plans are government entities.
One writer suggests that Medicare fraud, including Part D fraud, is still so rampant because federal enforcement measures are lacking. CMS has not taken as strong hand on enforcement as needed. In one situation, insurance companies suspended their marketing practices voluntarily after there were reports of fraud against the elderly in their plan, but these companies were permitted to continue their marketing plan just three months later. Reflective of these sentiments is a 2008 survey by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Senior Issues Task Force, which noted that out of the thirty-six states that participated in the survey, all but two of them had received complaints on the marketing of private Medicare plans within their state.
One reason noted for the limited success in monitoring and preventing Medicare fraud and abuse is that the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 preempts state legislation preventing fraud in the marketing and practice of Part D plans. Therefore, if a state wishes to enforce its own stricter regulations against fraud, these efforts may be preempted by federal law. In Uhm v. Humana Inc., a group of elderly individuals brought a class action suit against a PDP with whom they had all enrolled for their Medicare Part D coverage. The elderly plaintiffs argued that due to this PDP plans’ advertising methods, they thought that their prescription drugs would be covered by the plan once Part D began in 2006. However, when the plaintiffs requested information about their plan and requested copies of the forms needed to order their prescriptions, they did not get a response and had to purchase their prescriptions out of pocket—a great expense.
The PDP argued that the plaintiffs’ state claims were preempted by the MMA—the court agreed, reasoning that “the language of the MMA preemption clause is clear: if Part D establishes standards that cover plaintiffs' claims, then those standards supersede state law, and plaintiffs' state law claims are preempted.” While the elderly plaintiffs called such a result “absurd,” the court defended by stating that all PDP plans still must report to CMS according to federal regulations and such grievances could result in large fines to the PDP plans. This, however, is likely little consolation to elderly individuals who had to pay for their medication costs out of pocket, especially where it is possible that the MEDICs, who may receive such grievances, may have limited access to other complaints relating to the PDP plan and so may not be aware about the extent of fraud.
Some fraud may seriously risk an elderly individual’s health. In one heinous case, a sole physician at a small clinic, in exchange for $1000 weekly, allowed the two operators of the clinic to use his provider number to order rare medications, which were not medically necessary for the clinic’s patients, but allowed the highest payment from Medicare. The clinic dispensed some medication to their largely poor and elderly patients –despite that the medication was risky. While it was discovered that the clinic was not legitimate, the clinic managed to receive nearly $650,000.00 from Medicare before detection. Such scenarios result in many writers and activists suggesting plans for solutions.
One solution scholars have suggested for curbing fraud is to limit the number of plans available. Second, scholars suggest that state laws should not be preempted, to allow for more stringent regulation of Part D plans by the state.
The proposal to reduce the number of PDP and MA-PD plans available is premised on the notion that fewer plans will lead to less confusion, more efficient regulation, and greater standardization amongst the plans. The proposal is worth consideration due to the many choices that are available out there, which may confuse and overwhelm any person seeking to find an appropriate Part D plan. Further, fewer plans may limit the aggressive marketing tactics some Plans may feel they need to take to stand out from the many others.
The risk that comes with placing federal restrictions on the amount of plans available to Medicare Part D recipients—thus, the elderly and disabled—is that there is an unavoidable hint of paternalism. The proponents of this proposal seek to combat this assumption by claiming that the government limiting the number of Part D plans is comparable to employers acting as a broker while choosing their employee health plans. While this analogy may be disjointed, the proposal still has merit, despite the recognizable shroud of paternalism and possible concerns regarding restrictions on free markets. A system with limited providers may not be a limit on freedom of choice, as the proposal explains that there should still be a sufficient number of options. Some studies show that many elders report confusion and frustration surrounding Medicare Part D. If this is the case, limitations would be helpful in easing the choosing process. As the federal government would be responsible for narrowing the number of insurers issuing Part D, the government would also be responsible for evaluating the Plans’ quality.
Such a system may be beneficial in reducing fraud, if it could be shown that part of the reason that fraud occurs is because there are so many plans in place. A system with limited choice of Part D providers may not directly reduce fraud, but appears that its side effects may lead to such a result. It may be the case that if fewer plans are offered, government oversight could be greater because there would be fewer plans to monitor and audit; further, the quality of plans may improve. Further, beyond concerns of fraud, the other benefit that may come with such a plan would be “simplicity” for the elder in choosing a Part D plan. If limited plans are available, the first time an elderly individual enrolls, he may feel less overwhelmed and more willing to research plans that fit his needs best where the amount to research does not seem so vast and frustrating. While the true effect on providers is uncertain, another benefit of limited Plans may be that Part D plans marketing tactics may become less aggressive if the amount of Plans that are accepted to operate in each state are limited and enforced, so that there are not many plans jumping for a bite at the “apple” all at once. The theory is based on the idea that the plans providers will know that they have been accepted by the government as one of only a few providers in that state and thus, that their competition is limited to far fewer companies. Further, if that Plan attempts aggressive or suspicious marketing, due to the smaller “community” of plans, it is possible the other plans may be more likely to report them, providing for internal enforcement.
The second proposal to for reducing fraud is that federal laws and regulations should not preempt stronger state laws protecting against fraud in Part D plans. Currently the MMA explicitly preempts state laws and regulations relating to enforcement of state fraud and abuse plans because of the fact that Medicare is a federally operated program so, beyond state licensing or solvency laws, state laws are not applicable. The reason that some argue that state laws should not be preempted is that state laws and regulations to monitor and enforce marketing requirements and limitations “offer faster and more responsive remedies” than federal programs.
Such a plan to allow for state enforcement may be a very helpful solution where Medicare’s guidelines on some aspects of Medicare fraud, waste, and abuse programs are merely suggestions, rather than requirements. As discussed above, Part D plans are not mandated to report claims of fraud, waste, and abuse and additionally, the structure for implementing such plans are largely left to the Part D insurer. This is corroborated by evidence presented that the federal government and Medicare do not always take strong efforts to enforce marketing standards. While the news shows recent “crackdowns” on Medicare fraud operations by health care providers, it is not clear how strong the enforcement is for marketing, despite the federal regulations putting forth such standards. At least when Medicare Part D first began, “CMS issued only ‘warning notices’ to plans violating marketing standards.”
States’ ability to enforce their own stronger laws and regulations against Part D providers may be an effective option for fraud reduction. If Plans, especially those only offered in one state, are held responsible to the states, active state boards such as within Attorney General’s Offices and bureaus of Consumer Fraud could serve as additional pairs of eyes on the providers.
Part III: Conclusion
Proper information about Part D Plans’ abuse and fraud programs along with consumer protection education for the elderly and their caretakers can serve as important methods of protection. For the former, this may include that Part D providers must provide their current and potential enrollees with clear, plain-English information regarding the Plan’s fraud and abuse programs and detailed information on how an enrollee could file a complaint or grievance.
Second, Medicare should fund consumer fraud education programs to be taught at nursing homes and assisted living facilities; for those who may be living alone, this information may provided from Medicare and distributed to the elderly individual’s doctors, families, or the elders themselves. Additionally, the elderly individual should be taught basic fraud prevention strategies such as to never give out his personal information—especially to someone who calls over the phone or who stops by the individual’s home to enroll them in a plan. Elderly individuals should also be advised not to give their Medicare card or information to anyone they may meet, especially if the person offers free equipment, medication, or prizes in exchange for private information. While such suggestions may seem simplified when contrasted with the fraud reduction suggestions earlier in this paper and in many scholars’ writings, proper consumer protection education may be a first and important step in preventing against fraud until such programs might be implemented to target and monitor fraud from the inside, out.
 Id. (“Con artists know the effects of age on memory, and they are counting on elderly victims not being able to supply enough detailed information to investigators. In addition, the victims' realization that they have been swindled may take weeks—or more likely, months—after contact with the fraudster.”)
 Supra n.1.
 Alice G. Gosfield, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse ,§ 1:2 (2010). "’[Defining] fraud and abuse,’ as it is customarily used, to cover misconduct in the delivery and financing of health care.”
 Public Law 108-173. See also, Centers for Medicare & Medicare Services, Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Manual, Chapter 1 at 3. (2008), available at https://www.cms.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Chapter1.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
 Part D is mandatory for those who receive Medicare and Medicaid benefits, known as “dual eligibles.” See 42 C.F.R. § 423.34(a) (2005).
 42 C.F.R. § 423.30(i)-(ii).
 See Centers for Medicare & Medicare Services, Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Manual, Chapter 1 at 3. (2008), available at https://www.cms.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Chapter1.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
 Id. at 7.
 See 42 CFR § 423.780. To receive Extra Help, the individual must be either eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicaid, Medicare Savings Program, or whose income and resources fall below certain benchmarks. See generally, POMS, 00815.023 Medicare Savings Programs Income Limits, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0600815023. See also See 42 CFR §§ 423.773, 423.780, POMS HI 03030.025 Resource Limits for Subsidy Eligibility, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0603030025.
 Eighty percent of Part D plans have a gap and do not offer any gap coverage. See Richard L. Kaplan, Analyzing the Impact of New Health Care Reform Legislation on Older Americans, 19 Elder L. J. 213, n. 13, (citing Jack Hoadley, et. al, Medicare Part D 2010 Coverage Spotlight: The Coverage Gap, Exhibit 1, (2009))(citing Georgetown University/NORC at the University of Chicago’s analysis of CMS PDP Landscape Source Files, 2006-2010, for the Kaiser Family Foundation).
 The elderly individual first pays a $310.00 premium and then pays 25% of prescription costs up to $2480.00. POMS HI 03001.005, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0603001005, See also Pub. L. 118-148.
 Referred to as TrOOP, True Out of Pocket Costs. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Prescription Drug Benefit Manual. Chapter 9, Part D Program to Control Fraud, Waste and Abuse.
 POMS HI 03001.005, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0603001005; Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2011 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies and Final Call Letter, Center for Medicaid & Medicare Services (Apr, 5, 2010) available at http://www.cms.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2011.pdf at 34.
 See 42 USCA § 1395w-114a , Public Law 111-148.
 See 75 FR 29556 (2010)(“For purposes of sections 1860D-14A and 1860D-43 of the Social Security Act (the Act), as set forth in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Public Law 111-148 § 3301, and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Public Law 111-152, collectively known as the Affordable Care Act), see also, Social Security Act § 1860D-14A(b)(1)(B).
 See 75 FR 29556 (2010)
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 USCA § 1395w-114a ; SSA-POMS, HI: 03001.001, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0603001001.
 One study notes that after the 2006 implementation of Part D, in 2006, the mean yearly out of pocket costs for prescription medications decreased by 32% one year after Part D was put into effect. However, the study notes that this decrease in expenditures is for those who did not have any prescription coverage before Part D (decrease from an average of $963 to $517 between 2005 and 2006), while those who had some prescription coverage or were dual eligible people with Medicaid, Part D did not vary their out of pocket costs for medication very much (from $600 to $582 in 2006). See Christopher Millett, et. al, Impact of Medicare Part D on Seniors’ Out –of-pocket Expenditures on Medications, 170 Arch. Intern. Med. 16 (2010).
 See, e.g., Alice G. Gosfield, Medicaid and Medicare Fraud and Abuse, § 1.18- Medicare Part D (2010).
 Infra n.103. But see, 42. C.F.R. § 423.38(c)(8)(i) (allowing for disenrollment if there was material representation of the benefits of the plan while marketing the plan to the individual).
 See, e.g., In February, 2011, police arrested one hundred and eleven health care professionals across nine different U.S. cities for Medicare fraud. http://blog.lawinfo.com/2011/02/18/medicare-fraud-111-us-doctors-nurses-arrested/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
 See Rita Isnar, A Glimpse of the Future of Compliance Oversight by CMS: Part D Plans Case Study, Journal of Health Care Compliance, 13 No. 1 JHTHCC 51, (Jan-Feb. 2011), “Despite the requirements and emphasis placed on protecting the Part D benefit, few PDPs have met CMS's requirements for addressing fraud detection, correction, and prevention by developing an effective compliance program.”
 See 42 C.F.R. § 423.504(b)(4)(vi)(H).
 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104; 42 C.F.R. § 423.505(b)(4)(vi)(H), CMS Manual, Part D Program to Control Fraud, Waste and Abuse, ch. 13, at 3-4.
 Supra n.4 at 1189.
 CMS Manual, Part D Program to Control Fraud, Waste and Abuse, ch. 13, at 10,
 Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General, Medicare Drug Integrity Contractors’ Identification of Potential Part D Fraud and Abuse at 5 (Oct. 2009) (all data analyzed in this 2009 report is from 2008).
 External complaints are the primary source of fraud reports to the MEDICS. Id. at 3.
 Id. at 2.
 Id. at 8.
 Id. at ii.
 Id. at ii.
 Id. at 5. MEDICs do not only investigate plan providers, but also investigate pharmacies, providers, and even the Medicare enrollee.
 Id. at 4.
 Id. (citing Center for Medicare Services, MEDIC Statement of Work, § 6.2 (2d. Ed., Sept. 28, 2007).
 Id. at 5.
 Id. at 19, Table A-1: Top Five Types of Potential Fraud and Abuse Investigated and Referred to the Office of the Inspector General in Fiscal Year 2008.
 See 42 CFR § 422.2268(d). As this paper will soon discuss, Part D plans are prohibited from unsolicited marketing of their plans. See,Federal Trade Commission, Medicare Part D Solicitations: Word to the Wise about Fraud (Apr. 1, 2006)(“Providers may come to your home only if you have invited them to do so.”).
 See, Bloomberg News, Insurers Suspend the Marketing of Some Medicare Plans, printed in New York Times (Jun. 16, 2007) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/business/16health.html?ref=coventryhealthcareinc (last visited Apr. 22, 2011) (“ Agents also forged signatures, signed up the dead and enrolled mentally disabled people without consulting their guardians.”).
 Drug Diversion included visiting multiple physicians to receive more than one prescription for medication, transferring prescription medication to an individual other than the person to whom the medication was prescribed, illegally selling prescription drugs, and forging a prescription. Id. at 19, Table A-1: Top Five Types of Potential Fraud and Abuse Investigated and Referred to the Office of the Inspector General in Fiscal Year 2008.
 Id. at 9.
 Id. at ii (Executive Summary), supra n.
 Id. at i.
CFR 42 § 423.504(b)(4)(vi)(G)(3) (2010); Medicare Drug Integrity Contractors’ Identification of Potential Part D Fraud and Abuse at iii.
 Id. at iii (“One MEDIC office stated it received relatively few referrals compared to the number of plan sponsors in its jurisdiction. The two other MEDICs indicated that while some plans referred incidents of potential fraud and abuse, other plans had never referred any such incidents.”).
 Id. at iv.
 See Borer, supra n.6.
 Id. at 1.
 Supra n. 80.
 Borer, 92 Minn. L. Rev 1165 at 1.
 See, e.g., Masey v. Humana, Inc., 2007 WL 2363077 (M.D. Fla.) (Part D plan allegedly characterized their advertisements so that woman believed that her chemotherapy drugs and then had to pay out of pocket when the Plan denied coverage for these prescriptions).
 See, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Peoples Benefit Services, Inc., 923 A.2d 1230 (2007)( Non-government approved Part D plan marketed to elderly using symbols and names that the Commonwealth claimed would induce the elderly to enroll because they may believe that this plan was associated with—and approved by— the government).
 Supra n.94.
 Id. at 4; supra n.81.
 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners Senior Issues Task Force, Second State Survey on Medicare Marketing Issues (Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_senior_issues_medpp_survey_2n....
 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (2003) .
 Id. (“The standards established under this part shall supersede any State law or regulation (other than State licensing laws or State laws relating to plan solvency) with respect to MA plans which are offered by MA organizations under this part.”).
 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (2003), CMS Prescription Drug Benefit Manual, ch. 9, Program to Control Waste, Fraud, and Abuse at 15.
 2006 WL 1587443.
 Plaintiffs’ causes of action included “claim breach of contract, violation of state consumer protection statutes, unjust enrichment, fraud, and fraud in the inducement.” Id.
 Supra part II, see also Department of Health and Human Services, Officer of Inspector General, Medicare Drug Integrity Contractor’s Identification of Potential Part D Fraud and Abuse (Oct. 2009).
 See United States v. Silber, 2010 WL 5174588.
 Id. at *1.
 See section III of this paper.
 See, e.g., Thomas Rice, 35 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 961 (2011).
 See, e.g., Borer, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1165.
Id. at 963-64. Rice, however, discusses Schwartz’s piece which explains that too many choices in any market may lead to people making poor choices because the plethora of options is “so cognitively burdensome.” Rice also cites studies that have shown that “when more choices are available, the likelihood of investing in retirement vehicles such as 401(k) plans decline, and the quality of choices made among investors is worse.”
 Id. at 962.
 While such a program may be somewhat paternalistic, it is necessary to note that the entire system of fraud protection could be said to fall within the paternalistic category as well by arguing that the elderly and disabled are a more vulnerable class which may need added protections, as opposed to private, non-Medicare plans.
 Id. at 970. Rice suggests between six and fifteen plans, but that the number depends on the state.
 Rice, Reducing the Number of Drug Plans for Seniors at 966.
 This was noted in a comparable program involving competitive bidding for Medicaid providers in Arizona. See Id. at 977.
 Id. at 987.
 Id. at 989. Individuals frustration with choosing a Medicare program may be the reason why many elders will remain in their Part D program, rather than switching, even when their plan changes the medications it covers or increases its premium. See, Id. at 965.
 Borer, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1165 (2008).
 See, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-112(g); Borer, Modernizing Medicare at 1179. Note, CMS agrees that state laws on marketing of Part D plans are preempted by federal law. See Borer, n. 124 (citing CMS, Questiins and Answers on Preemption, available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/orgo2008/rg70720.htm.).
 Id. at 1185.
 See supra, section II, see also¸ Id. at 1188, “Depending on plans to self-police themselves is a dangerous strategy on its face and does not work in practice.”
 Supra n.56.
 See generally, 42 CFR § § 423.2262.
Borer, 92 Minn. L. Rev. at 1188.
 Id. at 1199. Borer points out that the fact that Attorney Generals are elected positions, they will respond to individuals complaints about problematic Plans or marketing tactics.
 Department of Health and Human Services, Information Partners Can Use on: Preventing Fraud (Oct. 6, 2006).
 Federal Trade Commission, FTC Consumer Alert: Medicare Part D Solicitations: Words to the Wise About Fraud.© Copyright 2011