May 24, 2012

Seventh Circuit Announces a New Standard for Retaliatory Discharge Claims Brought Under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act

Workers’ compensation-related absences pose a number of challenges for employers, including declining production, staffing shortages and employee morale problems.  When confronted with these issues, employers should be mindful of the very real dangers posed by discharging an employee who has missed time due to a workers’ compensation-covered injury, in particular the likelihood of an Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act retaliatory discharge lawsuit. 

Retaliation claims are more popular than ever.  Juries regularly reject the underlying discrimination claims in Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) cases, only to find in favor of the employee on the retaliation claim.  It fits within popular perceptions of human nature that someone accused of a misdeed will strike back, especially when the allegation is unfounded.  Similarly, it is not a particularly difficult leap for a jury to find that an employer wrongfully discharged an employee who reported a workplace injury, despite the employee causing problems for the company.  Indeed, employees need not show that their initial workers’ compensation claim was successful—it does not matter whether the initial claim was denied or even deemed frivolous—the employee need only prove that his or her termination was causally related to the exercise of his or her rights under the Act.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys often rely on the proximity of the termination to the exercise of rights under the Act, where simply telling the employer one is thinking of filing a claim, or seeing a doctor, can be enough to invoke the Act’s protections. 

Damages may include back pay, future lost wages, mental anguish, and attorneys’ fees.  Punitive damages may be awarded when the employee shows that the employer’s actions were willful and wanton.  In Clark v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc., for example, an employee was fired for fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with her workers’ compensation claim after her employer hired a private investigator who videotaped her mowing her lawn after she claimed to have suffered a back injury.  The trial court awarded summary judgment to the employee, finding that her termination was causally related to her injury, as she was fired because her employer believed her claim for benefits was exaggerated.  “While an employer may discharge an employee claiming benefits for a valid and nonpretextual reason, a dispute about the nature and extent of the injury does not constitute such a valid reason.”  697 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).  A jury then awarded Clark $150,000, including front pay and damages for emotional distress.  

A recent Seventh Circuit decision, however, provides a modicum of good news for employers.  In Gacek v. American Airlines, Inc., the Court of Appeals rejected the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting theory (used with Title VII and other EEO claims), which does not require the employee to prove causation when deciding workers’ compensation retaliation cases under Illinois law.  Instead, the Court applied the more rigorous Illinois standard, which requires proof of a causal link between the protected activity and a plaintiff’s termination.  This means that a plaintiff may no longer prevail on summary judgment by showing that the employer’s stated reason for the discharge was false—instead he or she must show that his or her protected activity was the cause of his or her termination.  This heightened burden may be the difference between winning and losing for an employer in a close case. 

There is no magic formula to follow when dealing with employees who have engaged in activities protected by statute, whether filing a charge, blowing the whistle, or, in this case, exercising their rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.  That said, it is essential that employers take a measured and deliberate approach, ensuring that such employees are being treated in a manner consistent with other employees who have not engaged in such activities, documenting each step along the way, and monitoring the actions of the impacted supervisors who are most likely to be viewed as having a motive to retaliate.   

© 2012 Vedder Price

About the Author

Shareholder

Aaron R. Gelb is a shareholder at Vedder Price P.C. and a member of the firm’s Labor and Employment Practice Area.  He represents employers in all aspects of equal employment opportunity, wrongful discharge and labor relations litigation before federal and state courts, federal, state and local fair employment and administrative agencies such as the EEOC, Illinois Department of Human Rights, Cook County Civil Rights Commission, the Department of Labor and National Labor Relations Board.

Mr. Gelb is particularly attuned to the demands and responsibilities of...

312-609-7844

About the Author

Associate

Emily T. Collins is an associate in the firm's Labor and Employment Practice Area.  Ms. Collins counsels and represents public- and private-sector employers in a variety of traditional labor and employment law matters.  She has experience writing position statements in response to charges from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights Commission.  Ms. Collins has also assisted on discovery and other litigation matters in cases before federal and state courts. 

312-609-7572

Contributors

Associate

Benjamin A. Hartsock joined Vedder Price P.C. as an associate in the Labor and Employment Practice Area and the Employee Benefits Practice Group.  Mr. Hartsock represents employers in a variety of employee benefits, labor and employment matters.  He has experience working with pension, health and welfare plans and assisting in ERISA litigation.  Mr. Hartsock also has experience in advising employers regarding compliance in a variety of human resource matters and assisting in employment and labor litigation at the administrative, state and federal levels...

312-609-7922

Boost: AJAX core statistics

Legal Disclaimer

You are responsible for reading, understanding and agreeing to the National Law Review's (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC's  Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free to use, no-log in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.  

Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. NLR does not accept advertising from attorneys or law firms. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com  intended to be an advertisement or a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional.  NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us. 

Under certain state laws the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.