May 24, 2012

"Supreme Court Decision Limits Use of “Stream of Commerce” Jurisdiction Theory to Subject Foreign Manufacturers to Suit in the U.S." - Litigation Alert

At the end of its recent term, the United States Supreme Court decided J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro (Case No. 09-1343, June 27, 2011). In McIntyre Machinery, the Court reversed a decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, finding that the New Jersey courts improperly asserted jurisdiction over an English machinery manufacturer in a product liability suit brought by an individual who was injured while using the manufacturer’s product in New Jersey.

The facts of the case are as follows: The defendant, McIntyre Machinery, is an English company that manufactures metal shearing devices used in the scrap metal industry. The plaintiff, Robert Nicastro, was severely injured while using a McIntrye shear in New Jersey. McIntyre sold its machines through an independent U.S. distributor, not controlled by McIntyre and not located in New Jersey. The distributor, however, followed McIntyre’s direction and guidance whenever possible. McIntyre officials also attended trade shows in the U.S., but not in New Jersey. McIntyre held U.S. and European patents on the machine. McIntyre generally desired to sell machines in the U.S., but there was no showing that New Jersey was targeted for sales, by advertising or otherwise. There was some evidence suggesting that as many as four McIntyre machines were located in New Jersey.

On these facts, six Justices of the Court agreed that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over McIntyre Machinery in New Jersey was improper. The six Justices did not agree on their reasoning. Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the judgment. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan.

The plurality stressed that the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution generally depends on the defendant having purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Product liability cases, the plurality wrote, fall within this general rule. The plurality specifically rejected the notion that placing products in the stream of commerce in a manner such that it is foreseeable they will end up in a particular state is not enough: “The defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.” (Slip Op. at 7). Further, although the facts showed a general intent by McIntyre to serve the U.S. market, “they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”

In the concurring opinion, Justice Breyer stated that he did not believe it was appropriate to use the facts of this case to set strict rules. He noted that the case does not “implicate modern concerns” (such as targeting the world for sales by selling on the Internet). Justice Breyer supported the view that a single isolated sale in a state is not enough, and that “something more” is required than simply putting a product in the stream of commerce with knowledge that it may be swept into the forum state. Justice Breyer also stressed his view that due process requirements, including “purposeful availment,” rest upon a notion of “defendant-focused fairness.” Such considerations may vary when comparing a large national manufacturer to a small manufacturer selling a small number of products through a distributor. “Further, the fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a domestic, manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute rule yet more uncertain.” (Breyer J., concurring, Slip. Op. at 6).

McIntyre Machinery is important because it limits the grounds for U.S. courts asserting personal jurisdiction against foreign manufacturers. In this context, “foreign” means out-of-state manufacturers as well as international companies. Six of the nine Justices clearly indicated that the simple fact that a product has found its way into a jurisdiction is not enough to establish jurisdiction over a non-resident manufacturer even though the manufacturer realizes that the product might end up in the state. The case will likely lead lower courts to dismiss certain cases which would otherwise have remained in court. Because of the fractured nature of the decision, however, its overall significance remains to be seen. Issues of personal jurisdiction will remain highly dependent on the facts of a particular case.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

About the Author

Partner

Timothy J. Abeska is a member of the Litigation Department in the firm’s South Bend, Indiana office. A partner, Mr. Abeska concentrates his practice in commercial litigation, representing clients in federal and state courts. The focus of Mr. Abeska’s practice is construction claims, commercial litigation including business torts, commercial loan workout and bankruptcy litigation, lender liability defense, transportation law, and products liability defense. He represents clients at trial and on appeal, in arbitration, and in mediations. Mr. Abeska has been selected for...

574-237-1119

About the Author

Partner

Michael R. Conner is a partner in the Indianapolis, Indiana office of Barnes & Thornburg LLP and chair of the firm’s Litigation Department. Although he has experience in most areas of litigation, he currently devotes his practice primarily to the defense of products liability and other personal injury actions. He serves as national defense counsel for a major Indiana manufacturer and, as such, has primary responsibility for cases throughout the United States. In that capacity he has litigated products cases in state and federal courts in more than 40 states.

317-231-7286

Contributors

Partner

Kenneth M. Gorenberg is a partner in the Chicago office of Barnes & Thornburg LLP and a member of the firm’s Litigation Department. Mr. Gorenberg’s insurance practice focuses on a number of complex issues for corporate policyholders. In addition to litigation of coverage disputes and negotiation of non-litigated but high exposure insurance claims, he performs insurance coverage analyses to help his clients understand and manage the risks associated with their existing operations and the risks they may acquire through corporate transactions. He also works closely with...

312-214-5609

About the Author

Partner

William M. McErlean is a partner in the Chicago office of Barnes & Thornburg LLP. He is the administrator of the Chicago Litigation Department and the Finance, Insolvency and Restructuring Department, and is a member of the firm’s Management Committee. Mr. McErlean’s practice is concentrated on commercial litigation. He has been designated an Illinois Leading Lawyer by the Leading Lawyers Network in the areas of commercial litigation and franchise law, and has been listed in Illinois Super Lawyers® magazine from inception through 2010 in the area of business...

312-214-8820

About the Author

Partner

Michael Rosiello is a partner in Barnes & Thornburg LLP, resident in the Indianapolis, Indiana office where he is a member of the Litigation Department and co-chair of the Commercial Litigation Practice Group. He concentrates his practice on commercial disputes, including contracts, sale of goods, trade secret, and class action issues. Mr. Rosiello also represents clients in trust and probate litigation. He works on pretrial proceedings, trials, and appeals in both state and federal courts. In addition, Mr. Rosiello’s practice includes drafting effective documents designed to...

317-231-7270

About the Author

Partner

John L. Watkins practices primarily in the areas of insurance coverage and bad faith, trade secrets and confidential information, and international business. He also handles other complex commercial litigation. 

404-264-4043

Boost: AJAX core statistics

Legal Disclaimer

You are responsible for reading, understanding and agreeing to the National Law Review's (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC's  Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free to use, no-log in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.  

Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. NLR does not accept advertising from attorneys or law firms. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com  intended to be an advertisement or a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional.  NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us. 

Under certain state laws the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.