Published on *The National Law Review* (http://www.natlawreview.com)

Article By:

Fred Reish

This is my 95th article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor’s (DOL) fiduciary rule and exemptions and the SEC’s “best interest” proposals.

By now, you probably know that both the SEC’s proposed Regulation Best Interest (“Reg BI”) for broker-dealers and the Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers (“RIA Interpretation”) have a best interest standard of care. The Reg BI best interest standard is for broker-dealers, while the RIA Interpretation best interest standard is for investment advisers.

At first blush, that suggests that broker-dealers and RIAs will be governed in the same way. That’s not the case.

While the RIA best interest standard applies to all advice to all clients, Reg BI only applies to securities recommendations made by broker-dealers to retail customers. Those are significant differences.

Let’s take a look at that.

Using the SEC’s language, the Reg BI standard applies to a broker-dealer “when making a recommendation of any securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities.” It doesn’t apply to recommendations about which account type to use, unless the recommendation involves securities transactions. On the other hand, RIAs are governed by the best interest standard of care when recommending account types.

There are similarities in how the standard applies to recommendations of distributions from retirement plans or to the recommendation of transfers of IRAs. (As this suggests, plan participants and IRA owners are “retail customers” covered by Reg BI.) Once again, though, a recommendation of a transfer of an IRA or a distribution from a plan would only be covered by Reg BI if the recommendation involved a “securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities.”

If the recommendation to take a distribution is made to a participant in a 401(k) plan, that implicitly includes a recommendation to liquidate the investments in the participant’s account in order to take a cash distribution. (See FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45.) The recommendation to liquidate the investments in the participant’s account would be covered by the best interest standard of care. The recommendation about how to invest the rollover IRA in securities is a second recommendation that would also be subject to Reg BI and the best interest standard.

However, it does not appear that the best interest standard would apply to recommendations to plans that are not participant directed. For example, a recommendation to take a distribution from a defined benefit pension plan or a cash balance pension plan does not seem to be a securities recommendation, because the participant does not have the ability to liquidate plan investments.

On the other hand, a recommendation by an RIA to take a distribution from any type of plan would be covered by the best interest standard. Similarly, for RIAs a recommendation about the investments in the rollover IRA would also be covered by the best interest standard.

With regard to transfers of IRAs, the same “securities transaction” limitation applies to recommendations by broker-dealers. So, where a representative of a broker-dealer recommends that an IRA be transferred to the broker-dealer, but there is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold securities (and, instead, the IRA is transferred without the liquidation of securities), there would not be a recommended securities transaction. As a result, the best interest standard of care would not apply. However, if the broker-dealer’s representative recommended that the investments be sold and then the cash transferred to an IRA with the broker-dealer, that would be subject to the best interest standard.

Any recommendation by an RIA to transfer an IRA or to sell the investments in the IRA would be subject to the best interest standard.

This article illustrates two points. The first is that the best interest standard of care for broker-dealers is much more limited than the one for RIAs. The second is that the SEC’s proposals are not clear on several major points. For example, wherever I use the words “appear” and “seem” in this article, it means that the SEC’s proposed Reg BI did not discuss the application of the proposed standard in enough detail to be certain about how it applies.

ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS: Reg BI is a proposal by the SEC to impose a higher standard of care on broker-dealers. It will not apply until it is finalized—perhaps a year and a half or two years from now. On the other hand, the RIA Interpretation is, for the most part, an interpretation of the current rules. As a result, RIAs should pay close attention to the RIA Interpretation.

*The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.*

Part 1- Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #1

Part 2 - Best Interest Standard of Care: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #2

Part 3 - Hidden Preamble Observations: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #3

Part 4 - TV Stock Tips and Fiduciary Advice: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary #4

Part 5 - Level Fee Fiduciary Exemption: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #5

Part 6 - Fiduciary Regulation And The Exemptions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #6

Part 7 - Fiduciary Regulations And The Exemptions : Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #7

Part 8 - Designated Investment Alternatives: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #8

Part 9 - Best Interest Standard and the Prudent Man Rule: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #9

Part 10 - FINRA Regulatory Notice: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #10

Part 11-ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #11

Part 12- Potential Prohibited Transactions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #12

Part 13-Investment Policies: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #13

Part 14- Investment Suggestions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #14

Part 15- Best Interest Contract Exemption: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #15

Part 16 - Adviser Recommendations: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #16

Part 17 - Level Fee Fiduciary: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #17

Part 19- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #19: Advisors' Use of "Hire Me" Practices.

Part 20- Three Parts of "Best Interest Standard of Care": Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #20

Part 22-Banks and Prohibited Transactions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #22

Part 24 - Differential Compensation Based on Neutral Factors: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #24

Part 25-Reasonable Compensation Versus Neutral Factors: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #25

Part 27 - Definition of Compensation: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #27

Part 28 - What About Rollovers that Aren’t Recommended?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #28

Part 29- Capturing Rollovers: What Information is Needed?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #29

Part 31 - “Un-levelizing” Level Fee Fiduciaries: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #31

Part 33- Discretionary Management, Rollovers and BICE: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #33

Part 34- Seminar Can Be Fiduciary Act: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #34

Part 35- Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Rule: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #35

Part 36 -Retirement Advice and the SEC: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #36

Part 37 - SEC Retirement-Targeted Examinations: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #37

Part 42 - Rollovers under DOL’s Final Rule: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #42

Part 43 - BICE Transition: More Than the Eye Can See - Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #43

Part 44 - Basic Structure of Fiduciary Package (June 9): Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #44

Part 47- “Real” Requirements of Fiduciary Rule: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #47

Part 49- The Requirement to Disclose Fiduciary Status: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #49

Part 50- Fourth Impartial Conduct Standard: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #50

Part 51- Recommendations to Transfer IRAs: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #51

Part 54 - The DOL’s RFI and Possible changes to BICE: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #54

Part 55- DOL’s RFI and Recommendation of Annuities- Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #55

Part 58- Recommendations to Contribute to a Plan or IRA- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #58

Part 60- What the Tibble Decision Means to Advisers: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #60

Part 61- The Fiduciary Rule, Distributions and Rollovers: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #61

Part 65- Unexpected Consequences of Fiduciary Rule - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #65

Part 66- Concerns About 408(b)(2) Disclosures: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #66

Part 67- From the DOL to the SEC - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #67

Part 68-Recommendations of Distributions - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #68

Part 69- **Compensation Risks for Broker-Dealers and RIAs: **Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #69

Part 70-The Fiduciary Rule and Recordkeeper Services: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #70

Part 71- Recordkeepers and Financial Wellness Programs: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #71

Part 72-The "Wholesaler" Exception: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #72

Part 74 -One More Fiduciary Issue for Recordkeepers: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #74

Part 75 - The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs-Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #75

Part 77 - The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs (#2): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #77

Part 78 - The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs (#3): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #78

Part 79 - The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs (#4)- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #79

Part 80 - Enforceable During Transition?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #80

Part 83 - Part 2 of Undisclosed (and Disclosed) 12b-1 Fees: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #83

Part 85 -The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 1)? : Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #85

Part 86- The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 2)?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #86

Part 87 - The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 3)?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #87

Part 88 -The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 4)? : Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #88