

The Fiduciary Rule, Distributions and Rollovers: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #61

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This is 61st article about interesting observations concerning the Department of Labor's fiduciary rule and exemptions. These articles also cover the DOL's FAQs interpreting the regulation and exemptions and related developments in the securities laws.

Now that it seems likely that the fiduciary rule and the transition exemptions will continue "as is" until at least July 1, 2019, it's time to re-visit the fiduciary rule and the requirements of the transition exemptions. This article focuses on the requirements for recommending that a participant take a distribution and roll it over to an IRA with a financial institution and its advisor. (Practically speaking, the financial institutions will likely be broker-dealers, RIA firms, and banks and trust departments). For ease of reading, this article uses "advisor" to refer to both the entity and the individual.

In order to recommend that a participant take a distribution, the financial institution and advisor must satisfy ERISA's prudent man rule and duty of loyalty. That is because a recommendation to a participant is considered to be advice to a plan. Among other things, that means that, if the advisor violates the rules, there is a cause of action under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty (as opposed to the Best Interest Contract Exemption, where a private right of action is less certain).

If the advisor will earn more money if a participant's benefits are moved to an IRA,

that will be a prohibited transaction. As a result, the advisor will also need to comply with the condition of an exemption, most likely the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE). The transition version of BICE requires that an advisor adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards. Of those standards, the most significant for this purpose is the best interest standard of care. Since the best interest standard of care and ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty are substantially similar, this article just refers to the best interest standard (even though both apply). The best interest standard requires that an advisor obtain the information that is relevant to making a prudent and loyal recommendation about a distribution. The Department of Labor has said that, at the least, that includes the services, investments, and fees and expenses in both the plan and the IRA. In addition, the best interest standard requires that the plan and IRA information be evaluated in light of the needs and circumstances of the participant.

The information about the services, investments, and fees and expenses in the plan is the most difficult to obtain. Fortunately, that information can be found in the participant's plan disclosure statements. Additional important information is in the participant's quarterly statements.

But, what if the participant can't locate the information? Realistically, that should be a rare case, since plan sponsors are required to distribute the disclosures at the time of initial participation and annually thereafter.

But, what if the participant can't find those disclosure materials? In a set of Frequently Asked Questions, the DOL responded that an advisor must make "diligent and prudent efforts" to obtain the plan information. If the participant can't find those materials, then it seems likely that, at the least, a diligent and prudent effort would require that the advisor inform the participant that:

1. The information is usually available on the plan's website and they could obtain it from that source.
2. The information is available from the plan sponsor upon request to the benefits personnel.

If neither of those options is successful, or if the participant is unwilling to take those steps, the advisor can use information from the Form 5500 or from industry averages. (Interestingly, 5500 data is not considered primary data for this purpose. It can only be used after a diligent and prudent effort has been made to obtain current plan data from the participant.)

Even where 5500 data or average plan data is used, there are additional considerations:

- The advisor must provide "fair disclosure" of the significance of using the primary plan data, that is, current information about the plan from, e.g., the participant disclosure forms.
- Plan averages must be based on "the type and size of plan at issue." As a result, the advisor will need to know the type and size of the plan.

- The advisor must explain the alternative data's limitations.
- The advisor must explain "how the financial institution determined that the benchmark or other data were reasonable."

However, it would likely be a rare case that alternative data could be used. If a financial institution finds that its advisors are consistently using alternative data, that suggests that the advisors are not making "diligent and prudent efforts" to obtain actual plan data. The consequence of non-compliance is that the compensation paid from the rollover IRA is prohibited and cannot be retained by the financial institution or the adviser. There could also be an ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

An additional issue is that the "alternative data" may only include information about fees and expenses. In order to perform a best interest analysis, the advisor must also have information about a plan's services and investments. For example, does the plan offer a brokerage account where, if the participant desired, the participant could have access to a wider range of investments? Another example is whether the plan offers discretionary investment management for participants' accounts. If it does not, that may be a valuable service offered by the IRA; but, if it does, the expenses and the quality of those services in the plan and IRA should be compared.

As this article suggests, there are more issues than appear at first blush.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

Part 1- [Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #1](#)

Part 2 - [Best Interest Standard of Care: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #2](#)

Part 3 - [Hidden Preamble Observations: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #3](#)

Part 4 - [TV Stock Tips and Fiduciary Advice: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary #4](#)

Part 5 - [Level Fee Fiduciary Exemption: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #5](#)

Part 6 - [Fiduciary Regulation And The Exemptions: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #6](#)

Part 7 - [Fiduciary Regulations And The Exemptions : Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #7](#)

Part 8 - [Designated Investment Alternatives: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #8](#)

Part 9 - [Best Interest Standard and the Prudent Man Rule: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #9](#)

- Part 10 - [FINRA Regulatory Notice: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #10](#)
- Part 11-[ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #11](#)
- Part 12- [Potential Prohibited Transactions: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #12](#)
- Part 13-[Investment Policies: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #13](#)
- Part 14- [Investment Suggestions: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #14](#)
- Part 15- [Best Interest Contract Exemption: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #15](#)
- Part 16 - [Adviser Recommendations: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #16](#)
- Part 17 - [Level Fee Fiduciary: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #17](#)
- Part 18- [Best Interest Contract Exemption and IRA Advisor Compensation: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #18](#)
- Part 19- [Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #19: Advisors' Use of "Hire Me" Practices.](#)
- Part 20- [Three Parts of "Best Interest Standard of Care": Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #20](#)
- Part 21- [Retirement Plan Documentation and Prudent Recommendation: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #21](#)
- Part 22-[Banks and Prohibited Transactions: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #22](#)
- Part 23-[Prohibited Transactions: IRA and RIA Qualified Money: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #23](#)
- Part 24 - [Differential Compensation Based on Neutral Factors: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #24](#)
- Part 25-[Reasonable Compensation Versus Neutral Factors: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #25](#)
- Part 26- [Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #26- Reasonable Compensation for IRAs: When and How Long?](#)
- Part 27 - [Definition of Compensation: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #27](#)
- Part 28 - [What About Rollovers that Aren't Recommended?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #28](#)

- [Part 29- Capturing Rollovers: What Information is Needed?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #29](#)
- [Part 30- Three Kinds of Level Fee Fiduciaries . . . and What's A "Level Fee?": Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #30](#)
- [Part 31 - "Un-levelizing" Level Fee Fiduciaries: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #31](#)
- [Part 32 - What "Level Fee Fiduciary" Means for Rollover Advice: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #32](#)
- [Part 33- Discretionary Management, Rollovers and BICE: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #33](#)
- [Part 34- Seminar Can Be Fiduciary Act: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #34](#)
- [Part 35- Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Rule: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #35](#)
- [Part 36 -Retirement Advice and the SEC: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #36](#)
- [Part 37 - SEC Retirement-Targeted Examinations: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #37](#)
- [Part 38- SEC Examinations of RIAs and Broker-Dealers under the ReTIRE Initiative: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #38](#)
- [Part 39- FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45: Guidance on Distributions and Rollovers: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #39](#)
- [Part 40 - New Rule, Old Rule - What Should Advisers Do Now?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #40](#)
- [Part 41 - While We Wait: The Current Fiduciary Rule and Annuities: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #41](#)
- [Part 42 - Rollovers under DOL's Final Rule: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #42](#)
- [Part 43 - BICE Transition: More Than the Eye Can See - Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #43](#)
- [Part 44 - Basic Structure of Fiduciary Package \(June 9\): Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #44](#)
- [Part 45 - DOL Fiduciary "Package": Basics on the Prohibited Transaction Exemptions: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #45](#)
- [Part 46 - How Does an Adviser Know How to Satisfy the Best Interest Standard?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #46](#)

[Part 47- "Real" Requirements of Fiduciary Rule: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #47](#)

[Part 48- The Last Word: The Fiduciary Rule Applies on June 9- Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #48](#)

[Part 49- The Requirement to Disclose Fiduciary Status: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #49](#)

[Part 50- Fourth Impartial Conduct Standard: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #50](#)

[Part 51- Recommendations to Transfer IRAs: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #51](#)

[Part 52 - The Fiduciary Rule and Exemptions: How Long Will Our Transition Be?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #52](#)

[Part 53 - Fiduciary Rule and Discretionary Investment Management: Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #53](#)

[Part 54 - The DOL's RFI and Possible changes to BICE: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #54](#)

[Part 55- DOL's RFI and Recommendation of Annuities- Interesting Angles on DOL's Fiduciary Rule #55](#)

[Part 56-Recommendations of Contributions as Fiduciary Advice: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #56](#)

[Part 57- Relief from 408\(b\)\(2\) Requirement on Change Notice: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #57](#)

[Part 58- Recommendations to Contribute to a Plan or IRA- Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #58](#)

[Part 59- What Plans and Arrangements Are Covered by the Fiduciary Rule: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #59](#)

[Part 60- What the Tibble Decision Means to Advisers: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #60](#)

[Part 62 - Is It Possible To Be An Advisor Without Being A Fiduciary? - Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #62](#)

[Part 63-Policies and Procedures: The Fourth BICE Requirement - Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #63](#)

[Part 64 -What Does the Best Interest Standard of Care Require?-Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #64](#)

[Part 65- Unexpected Consequences of Fiduciary Rule - Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #65](#)

Part 66- [Concerns About 408\(b\)\(2\) Disclosures: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #66](#)

Part 67- [From the DOL to the SEC - Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #67](#)

Part 68-[Recommendations of Distributions - Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #68](#)

Part 69- [Compensation Risks for Broker-Dealers and RIAs: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #69](#)

Part 70-[The Fiduciary Rule and Recordkeeper Services: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #70](#)

Part 71- [Recordkeepers and Financial Wellness Programs: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #71](#)

Part 72-[The "Wholesaler" Exception: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #72](#)

Part 73- [Recordkeeper Investment Support for Plan Sponsors: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #73](#)

Part 74 -[One More Fiduciary Issue for Recordkeepers: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #74](#)

Part 75 - [The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs-Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #75](#)

Part 76 - [Discretionary Management of IRAs: Prohibited Transaction Issues for RIAs-Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #76](#)

Part 77 -[The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs \(#2\): Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #77](#)

Part 78 - [The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs \(#3\): Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #78](#)

Part 79 - [The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs \(#4\)- Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #79](#)

Part 80 - [Enforceable During Transition?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #80](#)

Part 81 - [The Fiduciary Rule Prohibits Commissions... or Not \(Myth #6\): Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #81](#)

Part 82 - [Undisclosed \(and Disclosed\) 12b-1 Fees: The Different Views of the SEC and DOL - Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #82](#)

Part 83 - [Part 2 of Undisclosed \(and Disclosed\) 12b-1 Fees: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #83](#)

[Part 84- What Does the 5th Circuit Decision Mean for Rollover Recommendations?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #84](#)

[Part 85 -The Fiduciary Rule: What's Next \(Part 1\)? : Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #85](#)

[Part 86- The Fiduciary Rule: What's Next \(Part 2\)?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #86](#)

[Part 87 - The Fiduciary Rule: What's Next \(Part 3\)?: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #87](#)

[Part 88 -The Fiduciary Rule: What's Next \(Part 4\)? : Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #88](#)

[Part 89 - The 5th Circuit Decision, Prohibited Transactions, and New Non-Enforcement Policies: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #89](#)

[Part 90 - Parallels Between the SEC Regulation Best Interest and the DOL Best Interest Contract Exemption \(Part 1\): Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #90](#)

[Part 91- Parallels Between the SEC Regulation Best Interest and the DOL Best Interest Contract Exemption \(Part 2\): Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #91](#)

[Part 92 - SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers \(Part 1\): Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #92](#)

[Part 93 - SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers \(Part 2\): Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #93](#)

[Part 94 - SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers \(Part 3\) : Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #94](#)

[Part 95 - Regulation Best Interest Recommendations by Broker-Dealers: Part 1- Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #95](#)

[Part 96 - Regulation Best Interest Recommendations by Broker-Dealers: Part 2- Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #96](#)

[Part 97 - Regulation Best Interest Recommendations by Broker-Dealers: Part 3 - Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #97](#)

[Part 98 - Regulation Best Interest: Consideration of Cost and Compensation- Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #98](#)

[Part 99 - Investment Advisers and the SEC's Interpretation of Their Duties: Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #99](#)

[Part 100 - Investment Advisers and the SEC's Interpretation of Their Duties: Part II- Interesting Angles on the DOL's Fiduciary Rule #100](#)

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