May 23, 2012

Enforcing Non-Competes: Illinois Court Further Defines Adequate Consideration

An employer trying to enforce a non-competition or non-solicitation agreement today might feel like Mick Jagger did back in 1965 when he lamented, "I can't get no satisfaction/ 'Cause I try and I try and I try and I try."  Replace "satisfaction" with "adequate consideration," and you'll have a sense of the frustration employers often face. By now, every company likely knows that to have enforceable restrictive covenants (both non-solicitation and non-competition agreements), they must give adequate consideration in return. When an employee is "at will" (which generally means that he or she can be fired at any time), employment itself is usually the consideration.

Let's say you hire somebody who signs a restrictive covenant as a condition of employment. Or, as is often the case, you want an existing employee to be governed by a restrictive covenant. In return for that individual's continuing employment, he or she signs a non-compete agreement. Under Illinois law, that continuing employment, like the initial employment, can be adequate consideration.

"Can be," but not necessarily "will be." And there's the rub. For employment to be considered adequate enough to enforce a restrictive covenant, it also has to last a sufficient amount of time. The policy behind this requirement makes sense. For example, right after a new "at will" employee signs a non-competition or non-solicitation agreement, the employer can turn around and fire the individual. If the restrictive covenant is enforceable, the employee can be prevented from competing or soliciting customers for as much as two or three years—even though he or she worked for the company for only a few days. The law does not consider that fair.

So how much time is necessary before a court will deem consideration adequate? Until recently, Illinois law was somewhat unclear on this issue. In Brown & Brown Inc. v. Mudron, a 2008 case that one of my colleagues discussed in a previous issue of the Litigation & Counseling Alert, the court said that seven months is not enough, even if the employee quits voluntarily, while also implying that that two years might be the minimum. In an earlier case, Mid-Town Petroleum, Inc. v. Gowen, the court similarly held that seven months was not long enough. But in Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Resources Group, Inc., a 1977 case, the court found that two years was sufficient. That case, however, did not expressly hold that two years was the minimum amount of time necessary. Although these Illinois cases established that two years was sufficient and seven months was not enough, employers were left wondering if there was a number in between that would also be adequate. Would one year of employment be enough, for example? Apparently, the answer is no.

In a very recent 2011 case, Diederich Insurance Agency, LLC v. Smith, the Illinois Appellate Court expressly held that "in general, there must be at least two years...of continued employment to constitute adequate consideration." The court further noted that the two years begins to run from the date the restrictive covenant is signed, even if it is an amendment of an old agreement. In Diederich, the employee signed a two-year non-solicitation agreement in October 2007. Then in March 2008, he signed a new agreement that reduced the period of non-solicitation from two years to 12 months. In June 2008, he quit. The employer argued that the reduction of the non-compete term constituted sufficient consideration in and of itself. The court, however, disagreed—and held that two years of continued employment was the minimum necessary.

Despite these recent strides towards clarity, Illinois case law leaves some questions unanswered. For example, would the result in Diederich have been different if two years had passed from the date of the original agreement? Perhaps yes; perhaps no. But in any event, the overall message is clear. If a company uses employment as consideration for a restrictive covenant, then there must be at least two years of employment before the non-compete or non-solicitation agreement will be enforceable. To avoid this result, a company must give its employee some additional consideration to support the restrictive covenant. What would constitute sufficient alternative consideration is another unresolved question. But it likely must be something more than a nominal payment or a change in the terms of the restrictive covenant. For example, a significant signing bonus might satisfy the requirement.

In light of the Diederich opinion, along with prior case law, Illinois employers should work with experienced legal counsel to review their non-compete and non-solicitation agreements and determine if any steps should be taken to help make them enforceable.

© 2012 Much Shelist, P.C.

About the Author

Principal

Anthony C. Valiulis is an accomplished litigator with more than three decades of experience in a broad range of state and federal civil trial and appellate matters. A principal of the firm since 1979, Tony served as Chair of the Litigation & Dispute Resolution group for more than 20 years. His practice encompasses complex business and financial litigation, concentrating in four major areas: (1) business disputes, including non-...

312-521-2691

Boost: AJAX core statistics

Legal Disclaimer

You are responsible for reading, understanding and agreeing to the National Law Review's (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC's  Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free to use, no-log in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.  

Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. NLR does not accept advertising from attorneys or law firms. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com  intended to be an advertisement or a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional.  NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us. 

Under certain state laws the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.