Advertisement

June 18, 2013

Alleged Trademark Sublicense Assignable in Bankruptcy

Considering the fate to befall certain trademarks upon an owner’s bankruptcy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Court determined that a trademark license is not assignable without the owner’s express permission or in the absence of a clause explicitly authorizing assignment and a trademark license cannot be implied from a contract for services.  In re XMH Corp., Case No. 10-2596 (7th Cir. August 2, 2011) (Posner, J.).

XMH and its subsidiaries, including one called Simply Blue, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief.  XMH sought to sell Blue’s assets, including a contract for services between Simply Blue and Western Glove Works.  The contract included a sublicense from Western Glove Works to Simply Blue of the trademark JAG JEANS used in connection with various items of apparel.  The sublicense as originally executed only lasted for two weeks.  The parties also executed a contract for services to be performed during the year after the expiration of the trademark sublicense, under which Simply Blue agreed to provide a variety of services related to the apparel sold under the JAG JEANS mark.  Three months after the expiration of the sublicense, the parties extended it retroactively to last six months and also extended the services contract.  Later the parties opted to renew the services portion of the contract for an additional four years and provide for further renewal options which, if exercised, would extend to 2021. 

Whether or not the contract could be assigned during bankruptcy turned on whether the contract was a trademark license.  Western Glove Works objected to the assignment of the contract under bankruptcy, arguing the contract was a sublicense to Simply Blue of the JAG JEANS mark, which Western Glove Works itself had licensed from another company and which could not be assigned without its permission.

Judge Posner, writing for the court, recognized the “universal rule” that “a trademark license is not assignable without the owner’s express permission,” i.e., “in the absence of a provision authorizing assignment.”  This is because a trademark owner must exercise control over the quality of the trademarked goods.  If a licensee were permitted to sublicense the trademark to a seller over whom the trademark owner, having no contract with the sublicense, has no control, the quality of the trademarked product could be degraded without notice, making the trademark deceptive.  Because no provision in the Simply Blue-Western Glove Works contract authorized assignment, Simply Blue could not have assigned the trademark sublicense when it was in force.

Western Glove Works argued that the services provision of the contract which survived the expiration of the trademark sublicense was an implied sublicense, and therefore Simply Blue could not assign that portion of the contract either.  The court disagreed, stating none of the provisions of the contract constituted “any sort of trademark license.”  Further, the court instructed “[i]f Western wanted to prevent Blue from assigning the service contract to another firm without Western’s permission, all it had to do was get Blue to agree to designate the contract as a trademark sublicense, thus triggering the default rule.”  Therefore, the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court’s reversal order, thus permitting assignment of the alleged trademark sublicense without the licensor’s consent. 

© 2013 McDermott Will & Emery

About the Author

Associate

Shon Lo is an associate in the law firm of McDermott Will & Emery LLP  and is based in the Chicago office.  She focuses her practice on patent and trademark litigation and prosecution, as well as domain name disputes.

312-984-5810

Boost: AJAX core statistics

Legal Disclaimer

You are responsible for reading, understanding and agreeing to the National Law Review's (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC's  Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free to use, no-log in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.  

Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. NLR does not accept advertising from attorneys or law firms. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com  intended to be an advertisement or a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional.  NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us. 

Under certain state laws the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.