Advertisement

July 23, 2014

Supreme Court Rules for FTC in Hospital Merger Case

Holding in Phoebe Putney case narrowly construes state-action exemption to antitrust laws.

On February 19, in Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,[1] the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that adopted a broad view of state-action immunity from antitrust laws.[2] Siding with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in its challenge to the merger of the only two hospitals in a county in Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws apply to anticompetitive actions of state and local governmental entities unless the state itself clearly expresses an intent to displace competition.

Background

Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the FTC that the merger to monopoly would likely reduce competition. However, they reasoned that, because the Georgia legislature had given local hospital authorities—such as the defendant, Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County—the power to acquire hospitals, it must have foreseen that some such acquisitions might be anticompetitive. The lower courts, therefore, reasoned that the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition were the actions of the state and not reachable by federal antitrust laws.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that a state legislature's mere grant of general corporate powers to a subordinate state entity did not immunize that entity from the antitrust laws when it used those powers anticompetitively. The state-action immunity doctrine exempts private conduct and the conduct of subordinate state entities from federal antitrust laws when a state has a clearly articulated policy to supplant competition (and, in the case of private parties, when the state also actively supervises the anticompetitive activity). The Supreme Court determined that an anticompetitive acquisition was not "undertaken pursuant to a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed' state policy to displace competition" because, to pass the "clear articulation test," the anticompetitive effect must be a "foreseeable result" of what the state authorized, and the foreseeability test is not met when an anticompetitive outcome is only one of many ways in which the authority might be exercised.[3]

The Georgia legislation authorized the public hospital authorities to undertake all the activities of a business. However, as the Supreme Court explained, the legislation did not authorize the hospital authorities to undertake those activities in an anticompetitive manner: "[N]othing in the Law or any other provision of Georgia law clearly articulates a state policy to allow authorities to exercise their general corporate powers, including their acquisition power, without regard to negative effects on competition."[4]

The Supreme Court noted that its opinion does not require state legislatures to explicitly authorize specific anticompetitive effects before state-action immunity could apply, but it explained that a state policy to displace federal antitrust laws was "sufficiently expressed where the displacement of competition was the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise of authority delegated by the state legislature."[5] Here, the Court reasoned that the power to acquire hospitals does not ordinarily produce anticompetitive effects and thus the anticompetitive effect was not a logical result of its authority that would be protected under the state-action doctrine.

Implications

The Supreme Court's unanimous decision reversing the lower courts' decisions is a strong reminder that exemptions to the antitrust laws are construed narrowly and that general authorizations of activities cannot be assumed to extend to anticompetitive behavior. Rather, exemptions must be clear and explicit.


[1]Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., No. 11-1160 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2013), available here.

[2]. Antitrust partner Willard K. Tom was General Counsel of the FTC when the petition for certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court.

[3]Phoebe Putney, slip op. at 8-9 (quoting Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982)).

[4]Id. at 16.

[5]Id. at 11.

Copyright © 2014 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

About the Author

Partner

Willard K. Tom is a partner in Morgan Lewis's Antitrust Practice. Mr. Tom has worked in the antitrust field for more than 30 years, both in private practice and in government. In private practice, he has counseled and represented clients in merger and nonmerger matters before the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), state attorneys general, and federal courts.

202-739-5389

About the Author

Associate

Swati V. Rawani is an associate in Morgan Lewis’s Antitrust Practice. Ms. Rawani's practice spans a wide range of antitrust matters. She has represented clients before the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, and foreign competition authorities in merger investigations, criminal and civil cartel investigations, and other non-merger conduct investigations. Ms. Rawani has also represented clients in federal court antitrust litigation, including complex class action proceedings.

202.739.5851

Morgan Lewis’s Antitrust Practice is one of the largest and most diversified in the world. Our Antitrust Practice is distinguished by its substantial scope and depth, our base of knowledge and experience, and our international capability. We provide the full spectrum of antitrust services, from preventive counseling to advice on complex issues to defense of "bet the company" litigation.

In our client representations, we have tackled the most difficult antitrust problems in all sectors of the global economy. For example, we have handled:

    ...
202.739.5211

Boost: AJAX core statistics

Legal Disclaimer

You are responsible for reading, understanding and agreeing to the National Law Review's (NLR’s) and the National Law Forum LLC's  Terms of Use and Privacy Policy before using the National Law Review website. The National Law Review is a free to use, no-log in database of legal and business articles. The content and links on www.NatLawReview.com are intended for general information purposes only. Any legal analysis, legislative updates or other content and links should not be construed as legal or professional advice or a substitute for such advice. No attorney-client or confidential relationship is formed by the transmission of information between you and the National Law Review website or any of the law firms, attorneys or other professionals or organizations who include content on the National Law Review website. If you require legal or professional advice, kindly contact an attorney or other suitable professional advisor.  

Some states have laws and ethical rules regarding solicitation and advertisement practices by attorneys and/or other professionals. The National Law Review is not a law firm nor is www.NatLawReview.com  intended to be  a referral service for attorneys and/or other professionals. The NLR does not wish, nor does it intend, to solicit the business of anyone or to refer anyone to an attorney or other professional.  NLR does not answer legal questions nor will we refer you to an attorney or other professional if you request such information from us. 

Under certain state laws the following statements may be required on this website and we have included them in order to be in full compliance with these rules. The choice of a lawyer or other professional is an important decision and should not be based solely upon advertisements. Attorney Advertising Notice: Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Statement in compliance with Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless otherwise noted, attorneys are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, nor can NLR attest to the accuracy of any notation of Legal Specialization or other Professional Credentials.

The National Law Review - National Law Forum LLC 4700 Gilbert Ave. Suite 47 #230 Western Springs, IL 60558  Telephone  (708) 357-3317 If you would ike to contact us via email please click here.