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CFIUS and the New Trump Administration: Your Top Ten Questions Answered

One of the themes of the Trump campaign was the need for enhanced national security. Although the Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is not mentioned in Mr. Trump’s 100-day plan, it is highly likely that CFIUS reviews will become more stringent under the new administration. CFIUS reviews are the mechanism by which the U.S. government can vet merger and acquisition (M&A) activity involving the potential transfer of ownership or control of companies or assets to foreign interests.

CFIUS reviews have always been something of a black box. The information submitted to the committee is proprietary and not subject to release to anyone outside of Congress; the deliberations are confidential; and the reasons supporting any approval or disapproval are not released. The decisions are entrusted to the committee with little in the way of judicial oversight, giving the president a great deal of discretion to reshape the process.

This combination of secrecy and discretion in the CFIUS process has led to a great deal of uncertainty regarding potential sales of companies or assets to foreign interests, such as:

  • What types of deals will receive heightened scrutiny?

  • Will it become more difficult to get clearance for acquisitions that raise national security concerns?

  • Will the review process become a tool to halt Chinese acquisitions?

  • Will the Trump administration use the CFIUS process as leverage to ensure reciprocal access by U.S. investors to foreign countries?

  • Will the committee give a more prominent role to economic security issues instead of only focusing on national security, as is the current case?

To help deal with questions such as these, this client alert presents the “Top Ten” questions that every company engaged in M&A activity with a foreign dimension should be thinking about. This client alert is part of a series of “Top Ten” articles on the future of key international trade and regulatory issues expected to change under the Trump administration. Previously issued client alerts discuss the future of NAFTA and international trade litigation (including antidumping and countervailing duty actions) under the Trump administration. Future client alerts will deal comprehensively with all international trade and regulatory areas, where significant change could occur under the new administration.

The Top Ten CFIUS and Foreign Investment Questions Answered (or Is This the Dawning of the Age of the CFIUS?)

1. So what exactly is CFIUS, and what role does it play in protecting U.S. national security?

Although post-WWII U.S. policy has been to maintain an open posture for foreign investment, the Exon-Florio amendment in 1988 created CFIUS, which provided a mechanism to scrutinize foreign investments and acquisitions to determine if they have national security implications.1 After a controversy regarding the proposed acquisition of the commercial operations of six ports by Dubai Ports World, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) increased the scope of transactions subject to potential CFIUS review by adding critical infrastructure investments.2

The Exon-Florio provision, as amended, gives the committee the right to review proposed foreign “mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers” and to present recommendations regarding whether they should be approved by the president, who has the authority to block proposed foreign transactions that threaten to impair the U.S. national security. CFIUS functions as an interagency committee to review the national security implications of foreign investments in U.S. companies or assets.

As per Executive Order 13,456, the committee consists of nine members, including the secretaries of commerce, defense, energy, homeland security, state, and treasury; the attorney general; the U.S. trade representative (USTR); and the director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.3 The secretary of labor and the director of national intelligence also serve as ex officio members. The committee completes its review based upon jointly provided information regarding the proposed transaction, with the information provided in response to a lengthy set of questions as outlined in section 800.402 and other parts of the CFIUS regulations.4

CFIUS filings are voluntary in nature. Parties go to the time and expense of seeking committee review because, if a voluntary filing is made, and the committee approves it, then the U.S. government loses the ability to challenge a transaction, unwind it, or require mitigating actions. By contrast, any acquisition not reviewed is subject to divestment or other actions designed to address any national security threat inherent in the transaction. Through this carrot and avoidance of a potential stick strategy, parties to M&A activity are encouraged to self-evaluate transactions involving the potential transfer of ownership or control to a foreign person, and to seek a voluntary review where national security concerns potentially arise.

2. What has President Trump promised?

The CFIUS review evaluates the impact of sales to foreign entities, with the Defense Security Service separately reviewing foreign ownership, control, and influence where the National Industrial Security Program is involved. In the campaign, Mr. Trump frequently stated his view that foreign direct investment should be viewed through a national security prism, and was critical of Chinese acquisitions in particular, such as the purchase of the Chicago Stock Exchange. These views are consistent with those of key Republicans in Congress, who have sought to strengthen U.S. government review of transactions with a potential national security impact.

Mr. Trump’s transition team reportedly has determined that the CFIUS process will play an enhanced role in the new administration. The planned nomination of Mr. Lighthizer as the USTR is also potentially significant, as the USTR is one of the nine standing members of the committee. Mr. Lighthizer, who has worked for three decades as a prominent lawyer representing U.S. steel interests in antidumping and countervailing duty actions, and who has prior experience under the Reagan administration as a negotiator of voluntary restraint agreements to protect troubled U.S. companies, is expected to be an active supporter of the international trade themes espoused by Mr. Trump during his campaign for president.

There also have been indications that the new administration will favor an informal “reciprocity” test for foreign investment — i.e., that countries that do not allow a comparable investment in the same sector would not see CFIUS approvals. This is a mindset that could have special resonance for China, which often restricts foreign investment by other countries, including the United States.

3. What are the current trends in CFIUS enforcement? Will Mr. Trump’s pronouncements on national security work within, or potentially change, these trends?

The vast bulk of CFIUS filings occur in four sectors:

  1. Manufacturing

  2. Finance, information, and services

  3. Mining, utilities, and construction

  4. Wholesale and retail trade

Although reviews can arise for any country, in recent years they generally involve China, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Singapore, Israel, and South Korea.5

The Obama administration generally had a hands-off CFIUS approach. Despite the increasing number of filings over the last eight years, including those involving China (which is viewed as a problematic purchasing country), the Obama White House let most matters be resolved at the CFIUS level, without overt action by the White House. As a result, only two transactions were halted or required significant divestments by President Obama (for Aixtron, a semiconductor company, and for Ralls Corp., which was required to divest windfarm assets located near a defense facility). The transactions cleared included controversial transactions, such as the Smithfield Foods acquisition by China’s Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd., which raised concerns about a Chinese company taking over 26 percent of the U.S. hog market and food-processing facilities in more than a dozen states, key U.S. food-processing technology, and Smithfield intellectual property.6 Certain other transactions were abandoned by the parties due to opposition at the committee level.

The biggest change in CFIUS reviews over the Obama administration was the increasing prevalence of Chinese acquisitions. In the most recent three-year period for which data is available (2012 – 2014), the committee reviewed 68 potential acquisitions involving China, whereas in the three years right before the FINSA enactment there were only four. When Congress requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent agency that conducts audits and investigations on behalf of Congress, prepare a report regarding the CFIUS process, the request specifically noted that Chinese transactions may pose “a strategic rather than overt national security threat.”7

An additional trend is the increasing use of mitigation measures, which can include such conditions as restricting which persons can access certain technologies/information, establishing procedures regarding U.S. government contracting, establishing corporate security committees to oversee classified or export-controlled products or technical data, requiring divestments of critical business units, providing periodic monitoring reports to the U.S. government regarding national security issues, or giving the U.S. government the right to review future business decisions that implicate national security.8 The increasing prevalence of such measures, as well as the increased staff time required to monitor the implementation of mitigating measures, is one of the key reasons why increased staffing and resources for the committee process are likely under the new administration.

The implication of these developments is that while the number of transactions definitively killed by presidential action may not increase (as it is rare for companies to pursue transactions where the committee indicates strong concerns), it is likely that an increasingly stringent review process will result in more companies backing off of transactions that encounter resistance from the committee. National and economic security concerns will also likely lead to U.S. companies increasingly selling to safe buyers, as sales to U.S. purchasers or those in NATO countries are less likely to run into CFIUS opposition (or may not need CFIUS filings at all.

4. What does the committee currently consider in its reviews?

The current list of factors considered by the committee is established by statute, and consists of the following:

  • Whether the transaction impacts the domestic production needed for national defense requirements

  • Whether the transaction impacts the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements

  • Whether the transaction relates to the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by non-U.S. citizens as it relates to national security

  • The potential effect on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to a country that supports terrorism, proliferates missile technology or chemical/biological weapons, or where there is an identification by the secretary of defense that the transaction poses “a regional military threat” to U.S. interests

  • Whether the transaction could impact U.S. technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security

  • Whether the transaction has a security-related impact on critical U.S. infrastructure

  • The potential effects on U.S. critical infrastructure, including major energy assets

  • The potential effects on U.S. critical technologies

  • Whether the transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction

  • In cases involving a government-controlled transaction, additional review of the adherence of the country to nonproliferation control regimes, the foreign country’s record on cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military applications, and future U.S. requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources

  • Such other factors as the president or the committee determine to be appropriate.9

The manner in which these factors are applied in any specific transaction is entirely within the discretion of the committee. In particular, the view of what constitutes a national security issue is amorphous, allowing for the expansion of review to areas of concern not traditionally covered in prior reviewed transactions.

5. How might CFIUS reviews change at the Executive level?

There are a number of ways in which CFIUS reviews could change at the Executive level, even absent any changes to the statutory basis for the reviews:

  • Appointing new members with heightened national security concerns. As noted above, the committee is an inter-agency committee composed of key secretaries and other actors, such as the attorney general, that bring expertise and institutional knowledge regarding national security issues. The appointment of new actors to these positions will have a major impact on the type of review that occurs, as new committee members replace the more accommodating Obama appointees.

  • Tightening discretionary review. Because the CFIUS process is subject to a high degree of discretion and confidentiality, there is considerable leeway to change the way in which transactions are reviewed. Expansion could occur through informal influence, as noted, or through formal expansion of the parameters of review, such as occurred with Executive Order 13,456 (issued by President George W. Bush), which altered the scope of CFIUS review in the aftermath of the FINSA passage.10

  • Direction and control from President Trump. The CFIUS statute, as amended, lays out a concrete role for the president only at the end of the process. Nonetheless, given the high degree of confidentiality of the process and the likely interest of the president in national security matters, Mr. Trump will be in a position to exert influence on high-profile matters as they arise. Since CFIUS actions are generally not reviewed by courts, the new administration will have great leeway to change the scope of review even without any statutory changes.

  • Increasing use of mitigating measures. Although the statute does not contemplate the use of mitigating measures, the practice by now is well-established. Such measures are often agreed to by the parties because the alternatives of abandoning the deal or the risk of proceeding while ignoring such requests are unpalatable. It would not be surprising to see the increased use of such measures for companies that produce goods that are controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) or the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), where the U.S. company is a major supplier to the federal or state governments, or for companies that possess key high-tech patents that could be used to help jump-start foreign competition in a strategic sector.

  • Increasing scrutiny of China and other countries viewed as problematic. The CFIUS review process increasingly is the mechanism through which Chinese M&A activity is vetted, with Chinese companies having overtaken UK companies several years ago as the largest source of CFIUS requests. Republicans in Congress have requested that the GAO determine whether CFIUS reviews “have effectively kept pace with the growing scope of foreign acquisitions in strategically important sectors in the U.S.,” while specifically singling out Chinese and Russian state-owned enterprise investments as causes of concern.11 Given the large international trade deficit with China, as well as concerns that China discriminates against U.S. investment, while seeking open access to the U.S. market, the scrutiny of transactions involving Chinese companies is likely to increase. The same could be true of other countries that lie outside the trusted realm of NATO-plus countries (i.e., while NATO countries like France, Germany, the UK, and Australia/Japan/South Korea may still see relatively relaxed reviews, countries like Russia could see increased scrutiny).

  • Increasing scrutiny of state actors. For the last few years, there have been concerns that state-owned entities may be using their foreign commercial enterprises to advance the home country’s political agenda. This issue arises not only with regard to Chinese companies, but also with other countries where there are company ties to the government (including for countries where the ties may not be known publicly). The committee already requires the submission of extensive information regarding shareholders and owners, but sometimes is satisfied with the provision of information that only addresses immediate owners. The committee may require the submission of more complete information regarding ownership and control, both for indirect owners and for other avenues through which a foreign government might exert control or indirect influence (board members, etc.). This information could be used to support a more probing review of the role that the foreign government would have if the acquisition were to be completed.

  • Increasing scrutiny of sectors of concern. Certain sectors are viewed as presenting opportunities for foreign governments to treat U.S. acquisitions as supporting foreign policy initiatives or other activities inimical to U.S. interests. For example, acquisitions by Chinese telecom companies have been viewed as problematic due to the risk of potential electronic eavesdropping. Since such concerns fall squarely within the rubric of national security, increased inquiry into such ties easily could occur without any changes to the CFIUS legislation or regulations.

  • Expanding the definition of what constitutes a “national security” issue. FINSA added “critical industries” and “homeland security” as categories of economic security subject to a CFIUS review. “Critical infrastructure” is a concept that allows for ready expansion of the scope of review. Although not directly part of the CFIUS authorization, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism)12 provides that the term “critical infrastructure” includes “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” Sectors identified as potentially meeting this definition include telecommunications, energy, financial services, water, transportation sectors,13 and the “cyber and physical infrastructure services critical to maintaining the national defense, continuity of government, economic prosperity, and quality of life in the United States.”14 Expanding the CFIUS review process to cover similar concerns could occur without any changes to the existing legislation.

6. How might CFIUS reviews change at the congressional level?

Congress is not likely to be a passive bystander in the process. Republicans in Congress have been trying for years to alter the scope of the CFIUS review process and likely will view the election of Mr. Trump as an opportunity to enact this agenda. The advantage of action through legislation is that it can overhaul the CFIUS review process in one fell swoop, while implementing long-standing congressional concerns. Items in legislative play include the following:

  • Expanding the definition of national security to include economic security. Republicans in recent years have introduced legislation (but not secured passage) that would expand CFIUS reviews to cover economic security issues. Republicans will be emboldened to reintroduce these measures in the new Congress. If such legislation is passed, it is highly likely the number of submitted CFIUS filings will sharply increase.

  • Increasing committee staffing. There have been Republican proposals to expand committee staffing. Increased staffing will allow for more careful vetting of transactions and monitoring of mitigation measures, expanding the role of the committee in overseeing foreign direct investment on an ongoing basis.

  • Adding oversight of greenfield investments. In 2013, the Russian space agency Roscosmos proposed building Global Positioning System monitor stations in the United States. Although the proposal was blocked by CFIUS (due to concerns raised by the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense),15 the proposal raised the issue of whether the CFIUS process should be expanded to cover greenfield investments or new start-up ventures explicitly. Because the CFIUS provisions are designed to address M&A activity rather than new investments, there arguably is a gap in coverage that Congress could seek to fill by amending the statute.

  • Adding oversight of passive investments. Under the current law, transactions “solely for the purpose of investment,” or where the foreign investor has “no intention of determining or directing the basic business decisions of the issuer,” are exempt from review.16 Given the many ways in which owners can guide investment decisions behind the scenes, these provisions could be viewed as loopholes that should be eliminated.

  • Enhancing reporting to Congress. As originally drafted, the CFIUS process left Congress as a bystander. The amendments contained in FINSA added significantly increased reporting obligations (among other changes). Given Congressional interest in the area, additions to the current statutory reporting, including the possibility of extensive real-time reporting on pending transactions, is a possibility. Giving congressional actors’ access to ongoing filing information, even on a confidential basis, could make the CFIUS process a great deal messier.

  • Expanding areas of scrutiny. Due to prior controversies, food and agricultural acquisitions are likely targets for enhanced scrutiny under an amended statute, as are pharmaceutical, biotechnology, biologics, and high-tech products. For example, the Republican letter to the GAO mentioned food safety as a potential security issue, using the security concerns regarding the committee’s clearance of the $43 billion acquisition of Syngenta (an agricultural seed and chemical provider) by ChemChina.17 Legislation could detail areas of special concern, which would greatly increase the number of filings in areas considered sensitive.

  • Adding consideration of a “net benefit” test. Some congressional leaders believe that the CFIUS review should include a “net economic benefit test.”18 Such a test would allow the committee to examine the impact of transactions on economic security, labor and employment effects, and whether the country at issue allows for reciprocal investment. Support for such an expansion can be found in China’s own national security review, which is broad and arguably includes such a test, extending special scrutiny in the areas of agriculture, assembly manufacturing, and transportation.

  • Adding the authority to consider whether a transaction would “hollow out” U.S. manufacturing. The 2016 annual report to Congress from the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission raised concerns about whether the “large-scale out-sourcing of manufacturing activities to China is leading to the hollowing out of the U.S. defense industrial base.” Statutory amendments could make consideration of such issues a requirement of any CFIUS clearance.

  • Implementing recommendations of the GAO review. The GAO is conducting a review of the CFIUS process at the request of 16 members of Congress. The review will result in a report sometime in 2017 that will highlight perceived shortfalls or gaps in the process. Any issue identified will likely spur legislative efforts to address the identified shortcomings.

  • Implementing provisions targeted at Chinese state-owned entities. Due to concerns about the influence of state-owned entities in general, and Chinese state-owned entities in particular, the Exon-Florio/FINSA statute could be amended either to mandate increased scrutiny of state-owned entity purchases or to bar such sales entirely.

  • Increasing the role for national security agencies. The nine members of the CFIUS process do not draw from the national security agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Defense. Although these actors can be consulted on a case-by-case basis, the statute could be amended to make these agencies permanent parts of the CFIUS review process

7. Are there other potential ways in which the CFIUS process may be impacted by the change in administration?

If filings increase, this could increase the length of time for CFIUS review. Although the regulations provide for a strict 30-day review process (with additional time if a full investigation is needed), the committee has developed ways to stretch out this time period, including by taking a week or more to “log in” filings, requesting that parties provide “pre-filing” (draft) review requests to allow extra time for consideration, and requesting additional information from the parties (which stretches out the time for final decision). Prudent parties leave 90 to 120 days for completion of the process. An increased number of reviews could stretch this time period further.

Additionally, the change of administration could lead to turnover in career CFIUS staff (which is where most of the hard work of analysis occurs). The loss of this institutional knowledge could lead to increased delay, confusion regarding information to be submitted and what information is considered most relevant, additional supplemental questions, and less predictability in results

8. Can the Trump administration potentially undo or alter prior CFIUS approvals?

Although it is possible the new administration might try to undo previously approved transactions, it is unlikely. The statute provides for undoing previous approvals only if information submitted turns out to be false, misleading, or to have had material omissions. The chance of such misstatements being uncovered is low, given that most participants are careful to provide vetted and accurate information. Further, the ability to check the accuracy of information submitted is difficult because the information is confidential and exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests.19

While an argument could be made that the president has the authority to reopen a transaction under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,20 the entire basis of encouraging CFIUS filings on a voluntary basis would be undermined if the carrot of no review were put into question. Further, parties who worked through the process likely would mount challenges in federal courts arguing that the rescission of a lawfully granted clearance amounted to a violation of due process or a taking.21 Although one could argue that actions taken pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (which an unwinding of a cleared transaction would be) are not subject to judicial review, rather than court this kind of trouble, it is more likely the Trump administration will focus on tightening the standards for new transactions rather than seeking to unwind previously approved ones.

9. Sounds scary. What can I do to cope?

CFIUS practitioners have long benefited from developing a sense as to what types of transactions are potentially problematic, allowing for accurate triaging of the types of deals that should consider filing for CFIUS review. Unfortunately, these finely honed instincts will no longer be of much use. It will take years to establish the operation of the new CFIUS ground rules.

In the meantime, transactions that involve the transfer of ownership or control to a foreign party (including transactions where one foreign company is selling U.S. interests to another foreign company) should be looking carefully at national and economic security interests in every deal and considering whether a CFIUS filing is prudent. Parties to transactions should plan for potentially wide-ranging CFIUS reviews (and the accompanying delay) from the outset for any deal that raises potential national or economic security considerations. Merger contracts for such deals should include contingencies as to what will happen if CFIUS reviews are negative or involve unanticipated conditions, require divestments of key technology or assets, or restrict what purchaser personnel can have access to key technology.

With the range of potential mitigating measures including conditions on ownership and governance, the establishment of security committees to oversee controlled technical data, goods, patents, or intellectual property, potentially intrusive monitoring requirements, and other mitigating measures, the possibility that the committee could impose conditions that significantly impair the rationale for the transaction needs to be taken into account from the outset. Incorporating such considerations into the contract, the value assigned to the U.S. business, and into the timing of the deal can avoid unanticipated commercial issues that could kill an otherwise mutually acceptable deal.

Most CFIUS reviews have been relatively non-political. This may change in the new administration. Companies should accordingly consider the public and government relations aspects of transactions from the outset. The CFIUS process may play out in a new and more public/political fashion, especially if proposals to give Congress more of a role in the process are realized. Having sophisticated government and public relations teams at the ready to coordinate with the CFIUS legal and transactions team may turn out to be important in future reviews. Having a coordinated strategy to deal with various contingencies from the start offer the best chances for a favorable outcome.

10. What types of M&A activity should be most seriously considering CFIUS requests?

The type of transactions that will merit consideration of filing for a CFIUS review are in flux, for all the reasons noted above. Nonetheless, there are certain recurring situations that likely will merit serious consideration of a CFIUS filing. These include sales with the following attributes:

  • U.S. interests that produce, sell, or broker goods or technical data controlled under the ITAR (U.S. Munitions List products or goods modified to meet military specifications or for military use)

  • U.S. interests that produce, sell, or broker goods or technical data controlled under the EAR, especially if 600-series (commercial military goods) are involved

  • U.S. interests that produce, sell, or broker goods or technical data controlled under the nuclear-related export controls

  • U.S. entities that possess a classified facility or some form of top-secret clearance

  • U.S. interests that have significant sales to federal or state governments

  • U.S. interests in sectors of key concern, such as telecommunications, agriculture, food, high-technology, bio-technology, energy, critical infrastructure, or pharmaceutical products

  • U.S. interests that possess key intellectual property that is not generally available worldwide

  • U.S. interests that manufacture products where there are few competitors in either the United States or abroad, such that the sale would arguably move control of a limited-supply product to sole foreign control

  • U.S. interests that have property close to U.S. military assets;

  • U.S. interests that are part of the defense or police supply sectors

  • Sales to problematic countries, especially China

Conclusion

The entire international regulatory scheme is potentially in play under the new administration, especially so in the area of CFIUS reviews. While the contours of how the reviews will change is as yet unknown, in some ways, the prospect of change is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because CFIUS reviews are voluntarily requested when the parties believe there is a chance the deal could come under post-transaction inquiry, rumors of increasingly close scrutiny by the U.S. government, in and of itself, will increase the number of voluntary filings made by risk-averse investors. This will result in the committee having increased clout as the number of transactions where review is sought increases.
U.S. companies looking to sell to foreign interests, or foreign interests looking to purchase U.S. companies or assets, should closely consider the potential national or economic security aspects of their transactions, with the level of concern and likelihood of seeking a CFIUS review rising as the country of acquisition moves away from the relative safe haven of NATO and similar-level countries. One thing is clear: the CFIUS process is likely to change, and potentially to a large degree. Prudent companies will not want to be on the wrong side of the evolving standards for CFIUS clearance.


1 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170, transferred to 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565.
2 Id.
3 See Exec. Order No. 13,456, Further Amendment of Exec. Order No. 11,858 Concerning Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008).
4 See Dep’t of the Treasury, Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,702 (Nov. 21, 2008).
5 Id. at 27.
6 Id. at 12.
7 See Letter from Robert Pittenger et al., Member of Cong., to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. (Sept. 15, 2016).
8 See Cong. Research Serv., RL33388 (2016) at 27-28.
9 See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(f), transferred to 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(f).
10 See Exec. Order No. 13456, Further Amendment of Exec. Order No. 11858 Concerning Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 25, 2008).
11 See Letter from Robert Pittenger to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, supra note 3, at 1.
12 Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title X, § 1014, October 26, 2001; 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e).
13 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(b)(2).
14 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(b)(3).
15 See Cong. Research Serv., RL33388 (2016) at 13.
16 Id. at 16.
17 See Letter from Robert Pittenger to Gene L. Dodaro, supra note 3, at 1.
18 Id. at 1-2.
19 See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(c), transferred to 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(c).
20 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707.
21 See Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

© 2017 Foley & Lardner LLP

TRENDING LEGAL ANALYSIS


About this Author

Gregory Husisian, Foley Lardner, International Export regulation lawyer, Automotive industry Attorney
Partner

Gregory Husisian is a partner and litigation attorney with Foley & Lardner LLP. Mr. Husisian is chair of the firm’s Export Controls and National Security Practice, focusing on international regulatory issues posed by Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) economic sanctions, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission export controls, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and the antiboycott regulations. He also represents companies with national security concerns in acquisitions...

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