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Eleventh Circuit Examines “Debt Collector” Under the FDCPA

For those tracking Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) litigation for financial institutions and loan servicers, an opinion recently issued by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals provides new insight on the definition of ‘debt collector’ under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(6).  Following Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 14-14200 (August 21, 2015), a bank collecting on a debt acquired while it was in default does not categorically qualify the bank as a debt collector under the FDCPA. 

Under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a defines a ‘debt collector’ as follows:

(6) . . .  any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. . . .  The term does not include--

(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; . . .

In Davidson, the Plaintiff filed a putative class action asserting that Capital One’s state court collection suit for defaulted credit card debt violated the FDCPA.  Davidson argued that the distinction between a creditor and debt collector turns on by the status of the debt when it was acquired.    

However, “looking no further than the statutory text” of 1692a(6), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of Capital One’s motion to dismiss and held that Capital One was not a debt collector despite having purchased $1 billion of defaulted debt (including plaintiff’s loan) as part of a $28 billion purchase from HSBC because debt collection was only part of Capital One’s business, and not the principal purpose of its business.  Additionally, Capital One was not collecting debts due to another.  Thus, the Court held that the exclusions in 1692a(6)(F)(iii) do not obviate the substantive requirements of Section 1692a(6).

The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in this area breaks from decisions by the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the 1692a(6)(F)(iii) exclusion. See Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 362 (6th Cir. 2012);Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2009).  Significant to financial services providers facing FDCPA claims, Davidson provides additional insight in this area and highlights the requirement to plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that” the defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA.

Copyright © 2019 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.


About this Author

Jennifer Collins, class action defense, financial services lawyer, Womble Carlyle, mortgage origination legal counsel, consumer litigation

Jennifer Collins is a business litigator that focuses her practice on commercial disputes and defending class actions.  

She is a member of the Financial Services Litigation Team and regularly represents banks and servicers in class actions, consumer financial litigation, mortgage origination and servicing violations, real estate transaction disputes, and lender liability claims.

She has litigated a wide range of complex matters involving antitrust, fraud and theft of corporate assets, misappropriation of trade secrets...

Dirk Lasater, consumer finance litigator, contract dispute attorney, Womble Carlyle

Dirk provides active, engaged representation to banks and other financial institutions in commercial and consumer finance litigation at both the state and federal levels.  Dirk has experience with commercial contract disputes, commercial lending and residential lending claims, specifically with regard to:

  • the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)

  • the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) and

  • Various state unfair and deceptive trade practices statutes


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