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Best Interest Contract Exemption and IRA Advisor Compensation: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #18

As advisers who work with ERISA-governed retirement plans already know, an adviser’s compensation cannot be more than a reasonable amount. Because of the new fiduciary advice regulation, and the associated prohibited transaction exemptions (84-24 and the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE)), that requirement is being imposed on investment and insurance recommendations to IRAs. Interestingly, under the Internal Revenue Code (section 4975(d)(2)), it is already a prohibited transaction for an adviser to earn more than reasonable compensation from an IRA. However, because of lack of enforcement by the IRS, that requirement is often overlooked. As evidence of the fact that it is overlooked, think about the lack of benchmarking or similar services to help advisers determine if their compensation from an IRA is reasonable. But, that is about to change.

To appreciate the “reasonable compensation” requirement, a person needs to understand that the amount that is reasonable is determined based on the services that are provided. In its guidance, the DOL explains how reasonableness is to be determined:

The reasonableness of the fees depends on the particular facts and circumstances at the time of the recommendation. Several factors inform whether compensation is reasonable including, inter alia, the market pricing of service(s) provided and the underlying asset(s), the scope of monitoring, and the complexity of the product. No single factor is dispositive in determining whether compensation is reasonable; the essential question is whether the charges are reasonable in relation to what the investor receives.

However, there is a difference between “market” compensation and “customary” compensation. That difference is primarily whether the market is transparent and competitive:

Ultimately, the “reasonable compensation” standard is a market based standard. As noted above, the standard incorporates the familiar ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) standards. The Department is unwilling to condone all “customary” compensation arrangements and declines to adopt a standard that turns on whether the agreement is “customary.” For example, it may in some instances be “customary” to charge customers fees that are not transparent or that bear little relationship to the value of the services actually rendered, but that does not make the charges reasonable.”

As a hypothetical example . . . if an adviser provides a wide range of services, that might justify compensation of 1% per year of the assets under management. On the other hand, if an adviser provides a more limited range of services, that might be worth one-half of 1% per year (that is, 50 basis points). As a more specific example, BICE requires that advisers state whether or not they will be monitoring the investments on behalf of the IRA owner or plan. Obviously, all other things being equal, an adviser that provides fiduciary monitoring services is entitled to more money than one that does not.

With that understanding, the key question is, how will an adviser determine whether its compensation is reasonable? Most likely, it will be done in the same way that is in the 401(k) world. In other words, the value of services will be determined by the competitive marketplace. Since competitive market data is not generally available for IRAs, RIA firms and broker-dealers will need to work with service providers who have that information. In the 401(k) world, those are called benchmarking services.

The better benchmarking services will consider both the range of services and the compensation of the adviser. As explained above, the calculation of reasonable compensation is based on the services provided, but not just on the size of the account. In that regard, there will need to be a range of benchmarking alternatives, for example, discretionary investment advice for individual securities; discretionary investment advice for mutual funds; non-discretionary advice for both of those scenarios; recommendations for the purchase of individual annuities, including evaluations that take into account the different types of annuities (e.g., fixed rates annuities, fixed indexed annuities, and variable annuities); referrals to discretionary investment managers; and so on. The benchmarking will need to consider services and compensation in the first year and in subsequent years (for example, will the adviser be monitoring the investments).

While the services do not exist today, it is likely that they will in the relatively near future, say, in the next six to 12 months.

Forewarned is forearmed. Advisers need to be attentive to these issues, now that they are front and center.

The views expressed in this article are the views of Fred Reish, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Drinker Biddle & Reath.

Part 1- Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #1

Part 2 - Best Interest Standard of Care: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #2 

Part 3 - Hidden Preamble Observations: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #3

Part 4 - TV Stock Tips and Fiduciary Advice: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary #4

Part 5 - Level Fee Fiduciary Exemption: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #5

Part 6 - Fiduciary Regulation And The Exemptions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #6

Part 7 - Fiduciary Regulations And The Exemptions : Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #7

Part 8 - Designated Investment Alternatives: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #8

Part 9 - Best Interest Standard and the Prudent Man Rule: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #9

Part 10 - FINRA Regulatory Notice: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #10

Part 11-ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #11

Part 12- Potential Prohibited Transactions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #12

Part 13-Investment Policies: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #13

Part 14- Investment Suggestions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #14

Part 15- Best Interest Contract Exemption: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #15

Part 16 - Adviser Recommendations: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #16

Part 17 - Level Fee Fiduciary: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #17

Part 19- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #19: Advisors' Use of "Hire Me" Practices.

Part 20- Three Parts of "Best Interest Standard of Care": Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #20

Part 21- Retirement Plan Documentation and Prudent Recommendation: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #21

Part 22-Banks and Prohibited Transactions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #22

Part 23-Prohibited Transactions: IRA and RIA Qualified Money: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #23

Part 24 - Differential Compensation Based on Neutral Factors: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #24

Part 25-Reasonable Compensation Versus Neutral Factors: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #25

Part 26- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #26- Reasonable Compensation for IRAs: When and How Long?

Part 27 - Definition of Compensation: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #27

Part 28 - What About Rollovers that Aren’t Recommended?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #28

Part 29- Capturing Rollovers: What Information is Needed?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #29

Part 30- Three Kinds of Level Fee Fiduciaries . . . and What’s A “Level Fee?”: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #30

Part 31 - “Un-levelizing” Level Fee Fiduciaries: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #31

Part 32 - What “Level Fee Fiduciary” Means for Rollover Advice: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #32

Part 33- Discretionary Management, Rollovers and BICE: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #33

Part 34- Seminar Can Be Fiduciary Act: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #34

Part 35- Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Rule: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #35

Part 36 -Retirement Advice and the SEC: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #36

Part 37 - SEC Retirement-Targeted Examinations: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #37

Part 38- SEC Examinations of RIAs and Broker-Dealers under the ReTIRE Initiative: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #38

Part 39- FINRA Regulatory Notice 13-45: Guidance on Distributions and Rollovers: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #39

Part 40 - New Rule, Old Rule - What Should Advisers Do Now?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #40

Part 41 - While We Wait: The Current Fiduciary Rule and Annuities: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #41

Part 42 - Rollovers under DOL’s Final Rule: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #42

Part 43 - BICE Transition: More Than the Eye Can See - Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #43

Part 44 - Basic Structure of Fiduciary Package (June 9): Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #44

Part 45 - DOL Fiduciary “Package”: Basics on the Prohibited Transaction Exemptions: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #45

Part 46 - How Does an Adviser Know How to Satisfy the Best Interest Standard?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #46

Part 47- “Real” Requirements of Fiduciary Rule: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #47

Part 48- The Last Word: The Fiduciary Rule Applies on June 9- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #48

Part 49- The Requirement to Disclose Fiduciary Status: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #49

Part 50- Fourth Impartial Conduct Standard: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #50

Part 51- Recommendations to Transfer IRAs: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #51

Part 52 - The Fiduciary Rule and Exemptions: How Long Will Our Transition Be?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #52

Part 53 - Fiduciary Rule and Discretionary Investment Management: Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #53

Part 54 - The DOL’s RFI and Possible changes to BICE: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #54

Part 55- DOL’s RFI and Recommendation of Annuities- Interesting Angles on DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #55

Part 56-Recommendations of Contributions as Fiduciary Advice: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #56

Part 57- Relief from 408(b)(2) Requirement on Change Notice: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #57

Part 58- Recommendations to Contribute to a Plan or IRA- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #58

Part 59- What Plans and Arrangements Are Covered by the Fiduciary Rule: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #59

Part 60- What the Tibble Decision Means to Advisers: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #60

Part 61- The Fiduciary Rule, Distributions and Rollovers: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #61

Part 62 - Is It Possible To Be An Advisor Without Being A Fiduciary? - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #62

Part 63-Policies and Procedures: The Fourth BICE Requirement - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #63

Part 64 -What Does the Best Interest Standard of Care Require?-Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #64

Part 65- Unexpected Consequences of Fiduciary Rule - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #65

Part 66- Concerns About 408(b)(2) Disclosures: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #66

Part 67- From the DOL to the SEC - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #67

Part 68-Recommendations of Distributions - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #68

Part 69- Compensation Risks for Broker-Dealers and RIAs: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #69

Part 70-The Fiduciary Rule and Recordkeeper Services: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #70

Part 71- Recordkeepers and Financial Wellness Programs: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #71

Part 72-The "Wholesaler" Exception: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #72

Part 73- Recordkeeper Investment Support for Plan Sponsors: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #73

Part 74 -One More Fiduciary Issue for Recordkeepers: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #74

Part 75 - The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs-Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #75

Part 76 - Discretionary Management of IRAs: Prohibited Transaction Issues for RIAs- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #76

Part 77 - The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs (#2): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #77

Part 78 - The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs (#3): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #78

Part 79 - The Fiduciary Rule: Mistaken Beliefs (#4)- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #79

Part 80 - Enforceable During Transition?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #80

Part 81 - The Fiduciary Rule Prohibits Commissions...  or Not (Myth #6): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #81

Part 82 - Undisclosed (and Disclosed) 12b-1 Fees: The Different Views of the SEC and DOL - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #82

Part 83 - Part 2 of Undisclosed (and Disclosed) 12b-1 Fees: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #83

Part 84- What Does the 5th Circuit Decision Mean for Rollover Recommendations?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #84

Part 85 -The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 1)? : Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #85

Part 86- The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 2)?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #86

Part 87 - The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 3)?: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #87

Part 88 -The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 4)? : Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #88

Part 89 - The 5th Circuit Decision, Prohibited Transactions, and New Non-Enforcement Policies: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #89

Part 90 - Parallels Between the SEC Regulation Best Interest and the DOL Best Interest Contract Exemption (Part 1): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #90

Part 91- Parallels Between the SEC Regulation Best Interest and the DOL Best Interest Contract Exemption (Part 2): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #91

Part 92 - SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers (Part 1): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #92

Part 93 - SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers (Part 2): Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #93

Part 94 - SEC Proposed Reg BI and Recommendations of Rollovers (Part 3) : Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #94

Part 95 - Regulation Best Interest Recommendations by Broker-Dealers: Part 1- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #95

Part 96 - Regulation Best Interest Recommendations by Broker-Dealers: Part 2- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #96

Part 97 – Regulation Best Interest Recommendations by Broker-Dealers: Part 3 - Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #97

Part 98 – Regulation Best Interest: Consideration of Cost and Compensation- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #98

Part 99 – Investment Advisers and the SEC's Interpretation of Their Duties: Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #99

Part 100 - Investment Advisers and the SEC’s Interpretation of Their Duties: Part II- Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #100

 

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About this Author

Fred Reisch, Drinker Biddle Law Firm, Los Angeles, Labor and Employment Law Attorney
Partner

Fred Reish represents clients in fiduciary issues, prohibited transactions, tax-qualification and Department of Labor, Securities and Exchange Commission and FINRA examinations of retirement plans and IRA issues.

Fred works with both private and public sector entities and their plans and fiduciaries and represents plans, employers and fiduciaries before federal agencies such as the DOL and IRS. He consults with banks, trust companies, insurance companies and mutual fund management companies on 401(k) recordkeeping services, investment products and...

(310) 203-4047