SEC Approves NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ Compensation Committee Lis

Jeff C. Dodd

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Scott L. Olson

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SEC Approves NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ Compensation Committee Listing Standards

by: Jeff C. Dodd, Scott L. Olson of Hunton Andrews Kurth - e-alert

Friday, February 22, 2013

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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently approved amendments to the compensation committee listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),¹ the NYSE MKT² and the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ)³ that were initially proposed in September 2012 to comply with Rule 10C-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.⁴ In approving the listing standards, the SEC did not require any changes to the exchanges’ proposals, as amended.

The new listing standards will impact the authority and responsibilities of compensation committees with respect to their advisers and the independence analysis for compensation committee members. Although the SEC has approved the new compensation committee listing standards, issuers with listed equity securities subject to the new standards will have time to comply as follows.

NYSE- and NYSE MKT-listed issuers have until:

the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the enhanced compensation committee independence standards; and
July 1, 2013 to comply with the remaining standards (e.g., the authority to retain and fund advisers to the committee and the responsibility to consider specified independence factors before selecting or receiving advice from advisers).

NASDAQ-listed issuers have until:

July 1, 2013 to establish in the compensation committee charter, board resolutions or other board action the compensation committee's new responsibilities and authority (i.e., the authority to retain and fund advisers to the committee and the responsibility to consider specified independence factors before selecting or receiving advice from advisers); and
the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the remaining standards (e.g., have a formal compensation committee of at least two independent directors, have a compensation committee charter and satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standards).

Current compensation committee listing standards will apply pending the transition to the new standards.

Click here to read about key aspects of the NYSE’s new compensation committee listing standards.

Click here to read about key aspects of the NYSE MKT’s new compensation committee listing standards.

Click here to read about key aspects of NASDAQ’s new compensation committee listing standards.

Click here to read about practical considerations for NYSE-, NYSE MKT- and NASDAQ-listed issuers to consider in response to the new compensation committee listing standards.

NYSE Compensation Committee Listing Standards

Committee charter requirements for compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding its advisers. In addition to current NYSE charter requirements, compensation committee charters must specify the following:

the committee’s authority, in its sole discretion, to retain or obtain the advice of a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser (collectively referred to throughout the discussion of the NYSE’s new listing standards as advisers);
the committee’s direct responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the work of any adviser retained by the committee;
the issuer’s responsibility to provide for appropriate funding (as determined by the committee) for the payment of reasonable compensation to any adviser retained by the committee; and
the committee’s responsibility to conduct an independence assessment before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser to the committee (as discussed in more detail below under “Assessment of adviser independence”).

The new authority and responsibilities regarding advisers do not:

require the compensation committee to implement or follow its advisers’ advice or recommendations; or
affect the ability or obligation of the compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfilling its duties.

Assessment of adviser independence. As noted above and subject to limited exceptions discussed below, before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser (for compensation or non-compensation matters and regardless of who retained the adviser), the compensation committee must consider all factors relevant to that adviser’s independence from management, including:

the provision of other services to the issuer by the adviser’s employer;
the amount of fees received from the issuer by the adviser’s employer, as a percentage of the employer’s total revenue;
the policies and procedures of the adviser’s employer that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest;
any business or personal relationship between the adviser and a compensation committee member;
any issuer stock owned by the adviser (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, it interprets this to include stock owned by the adviser’s immediate family members); and
any business or personal relationship between either the adviser or the adviser’s employer and an issuer’s executive officer (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, this would include, for example, situations where an issuer’s CEO and the adviser have a familial relationship or where the CEO and the adviser or the adviser’s employer are business partners).

These factors are considerations for the compensation committee rather than bright-line standards. Although compensation committees must consider the specified factors, they are also responsible for identifying and considering all additional factors relevant to an adviser’s independence from management. After conducting the required independence assessment, compensation committees may select or receive advice from any adviser they prefer, even those that are not independent.⁵ In response to comments that compensation committees should be specifically required to also consider whether an adviser requires a contractual agreement to indemnify the adviser or limit the adviser’s liability, the NYSE noted that it is not apparent that the existence of such indemnification agreements or contractual limitations on liability is relevant to an independence analysis.⁶

Compensation committees must conduct the independence assessment for any adviser that the committee selects or receives advice from, other than:

in-house legal counsel; and
any adviser whose role is limited to:
- consulting on any broad-based plan that does not discriminate in scope, terms, or operation, in favor of executive officers or directors of the issuer, and that is available generally to all salaried employees; or
- providing information that either is not customized for a particular issuer or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the adviser and about which the adviser does not provide advice.

In response to comments, the NYSE made it clear that the independence assessment requirement applies to any outside legal counsel consulted by the compensation committee, including any regular outside counsel to the issuer consulted on matters such as SEC filing requirements or federal tax issues associated with equity compensation plans.

In response to a comment expressing concern about the possible need to conduct a new independence assessment before every compensation committee meeting for those advisers that regularly provide advice to the compensation committee, the NYSE indicated that the frequency of the assessment will be a facts and circumstances determination. Specifically, the NYSE noted that “[w]hile an annual assessment may be sufficient in some cases, in other circumstances a more frequent review may be warranted.” In approving the new standards, the SEC noted its expectation that the assessment would be conducted at least annually.

Compensation committee independence. Current listing standards require that a compensation committee be comprised solely of independent directors, and the board must affirmatively determine that a compensation committee member is independent under the general board independence standards set forth in Section 303A.02 of the Manual.

Under the new standards, in making an affirmative independence determination regarding a compensation committee member the board must also consider all factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship to the issuer that is material to that director’s ability to be independent from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member, including:

the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the issuer to the director; and
whether the director is affiliated with the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer.

These factors do not include any specific numerical or materiality tests, and are considerations for the board rather than bright-line standards. For example, the NYSE did not adopt an absolute prohibition on a board making an affirmative independence finding for a compensation committee member solely because the member or any of his or her affiliates are significant stockholders. Although the board must consider the specified factors, it must also identify and consider all additional factors that would be relevant to a compensation committee member’s independence from management. In response to comments, the NYSE confirmed that a single factor or relationship considered in the independence analysis may be sufficiently material to render a director non-independent.

When considering the source of a director’s compensation, the board should consider whether the director receives compensation from any person or entity that would impair his or her ability to make independent judgments about the issuer’s executive compensation. Likewise, when considering any affiliate relationship, the board should consider whether the relationship places the director under the direct or indirect control of the issuer or its senior management, or creates a direct relationship between the director and senior management, in each case of a nature that would impair the director’s ability to make independent judgments about the issuer’s executive compensation.

In response to comments that director fees should be an explicit factor to be considered in compensation committee independence determinations, the NYSE noted that it does not believe that it is likely that director fees would be a relevant consideration for the independence analysis. However, if “excessive” board compensation might affect a director’s independence, the NYSE noted that the listing standards would require the board to consider that factor in its independence determination, as the standards require the board to consider all relevant factors. The NYSE did not indicate what constitutes “excessive” board compensation.

If a compensation committee member ceases to be independent for reasons outside that member’s reasonable control, the member may, with prompt notice by the issuer to the NYSE, remain a compensation committee member until the earlier of (1) the next annual stockholder meeting or (2) one year from the event that caused the member to cease to be independent. This cure provision is limited to situations where the compensation committee continues to have a majority of independent directors.

Exemptions. The new compensation committee listing standards will not apply to the following issuers that are exempt from the NYSE’s current compensation committee listing standards:

controlled companies (i.e., issuers where more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group or another company);
limited partnerships (for example, master limited partnerships (MLPs));
companies in bankruptcy;
closed-end and open-end funds registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act);
passive business organizations in the form of trusts (for example, royalty trusts);
derivatives and special purpose securities; and
issuers whose only listed equity security is preferred stock.

Smaller reporting companies (generally issuers with less than $75 million of public equity float) are exempt from the new enhanced compensation committee independence and consideration of adviser independence standards. As a result, their compensation committee charters will not have to reflect these matters. However, these issuers are subject to the other new standards. An issuer that ceases to qualify as a smaller reporting company will have:

six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to comply with the consideration of adviser independence standard;
six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have one member of its compensation committee satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard;
nine months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have a majority of its compensation committee members satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard; and
12 months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have a compensation committee consisting entirely of members that satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard.⁷

Foreign private issuers that elect to follow home country practice are exempt from the new compensation committee listing standards provided that they comply with the disclosure requirements of Section 303A.11 of the Manual.

Transition periods for newly-listed and other issuers. The current transition periods available to newly-listed issuers and certain other categories of issuers (e.g., issuers listing in connection with a carve-out or spin-off transaction) apply to the new compensation committee listing standards. For example, an issuer listing in connection with its initial public offering (IPO) must have one independent compensation committee member by the earlier of the IPO closing date or five business days from the listing date, a majority of independent members within 90 days of the listing date, and a fully independent committee within one year of the listing date.

Click here to read about practical considerations to consider in response to the new compensation committee listing standards.

NYSE MKT Compensation Committee Listing Standards

Compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding its advisers. A compensation committee⁸ must have the following authority and responsibilities:

the authority, in its sole discretion, to retain or obtain the advice of a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser (collectively referred to throughout the discussion of the NYSE MKT’s new listing standards as advisers);
the direct responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the work of any adviser retained by the committee;
the issuer must provide for appropriate funding (as determined by the committee) for the payment of reasonable compensation to any adviser retained by the committee; and
the responsibility to conduct an independence assessment before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser to the committee (as discussed in more detail below under “Assessment of adviser independence”).

The new authority and responsibilities regarding advisers do not:

require the compensation committee to implement or follow its advisers’ advice or recommendations; or
affect the ability or obligation of the compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfilling its duties.

the provision of other services to the issuer by the adviser’s employer;
the amount of fees received from the issuer by the adviser’s employer, as a percentage of the employer’s total revenue;
the policies and procedures of the adviser’s employer that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest;
any business or personal relationship between the adviser and a compensation committee member;
any issuer stock owned by the adviser (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, it interprets this to include stock owned by the adviser’s immediate family members); and
any business or personal relationship between either the adviser or the adviser’s employer and an issuer’s executive officer (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, this would include, for example, situations where an issuer’s CEO and the adviser have a familial relationship or where the CEO and the adviser or the adviser’s employer are business partners).

These factors are considerations for the compensation committee rather than bright-line standards. Although compensation committees must consider the specified factors, they are also responsible for identifying and considering all additional factors relevant to an adviser’s independence from management. After conducting the required independence assessment, compensation committees may select or receive advice from any adviser they prefer, even those that are not independent.⁹ In response to comments that compensation committees should be specifically required to also consider whether an adviser requires a contractual agreement to indemnify the adviser or limit the adviser’s liability, the NYSE MKT noted that it is not apparent that the existence of such indemnification agreements or contractual limitations on liability is relevant to an independence analysis.¹⁰

Compensation committees must conduct the independence assessment for any adviser that the committee selects or receives advice from, other than:

in-house legal counsel; and
any adviser whose role is limited to:
- consulting on any broad-based plan that does not discriminate in scope, terms, or operation, in favor of executive officers or directors of the issuer, and that is available generally to all salaried employees; or
- providing information that either is not customized for a particular issuer or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the adviser and about which the adviser does not provide advice.

In response to comments, the NYSE MKT made it clear that the independence assessment requirement applies to any outside legal counsel consulted by the compensation committee, including any regular outside counsel to the issuer consulted on matters such as SEC filing requirements or federal tax issues associated with equity compensation plans.

In response to a comment expressing concern about the possible need to conduct a new independence assessment before every compensation committee meeting for those advisers that regularly provide advice to the compensation committee, the NYSE MKT indicated that the frequency of the assessment will be a facts and circumstances determination. Specifically, the NYSE MKT noted that “[w]hile an annual assessment may be sufficient in some cases, in other circumstances a more frequent review may be warranted.” In approving the new standards, the SEC noted its expectation that the assessment would be conducted at least annually.

Compensation committee independence. Current listing standards require that executive officer compensation be determined, or recommended to the board for determination, either by a compensation committee comprised solely of independent directors or by a majority of the independent directors. Moreover, the board must affirmatively determine that a compensation committee member is independent under the general board independence standards set forth in Section 803A(2) of the Guide.

Under the new standards, the board must also affirmatively determine that all of the compensation committee members (or all of the independent directors if an issuer does not have a compensation committee) are independent for compensation committee purposes. To make this determination, the board must consider all factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship to the issuer that is material to that director’s ability to be independent from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member, including:

the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the issuer to the director; and
whether the director is affiliated with the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer.

These factors do not include any specific numerical or materiality tests, and are considerations for the board rather than bright-line standards. For example, the NYSE MKT did not adopt an absolute prohibition on a board making an affirmative independence finding for a compensation committee member solely because the member or any of his or her affiliates are significant stockholders. Although the board must consider the specified factors, it must also identify and consider all additional factors that would be relevant to a compensation committee member’s independence from management. In response to comments, the NYSE MKT confirmed that a single factor or relationship considered in the independence analysis may be sufficiently material to render a director non-independent.

In response to comments that director fees should be an explicit factor to be considered in compensation committee independence determinations, the NYSE MKT noted that it does not believe that it is likely that director fees would be a relevant consideration for the independence analysis. However, if “excessive” board compensation might affect a director’s independence, the NYSE MKT noted that the listing standards would require the board to consider that factor in its independence determination, as the standards require the board to consider all relevant factors. The NYSE MKT did not indicate what constitutes “excessive” board compensation.

If a compensation committee member ceases to be independent for reasons outside that member’s reasonable control, the member may, with prompt notice by the issuer to the NYSE MKT, remain a compensation committee member until the earlier of (1) the next annual stockholders meeting or (2) one year from the event that caused the member to cease to be independent. This cure provision is limited to situations where the compensation committee continues to have a majority of independent directors.

The NYSE MKT amended its listing standards so that only smaller reporting companies (generally issuers with less than $75 million of public equity float) may rely on the current exception that allows one non-independent director to serve on the compensation committee under exceptional and limited circumstances, even for a director who fails the enhanced compensation committee independence standards. Under the exception, one non-independent director may be appointed to the compensation committee if:

the committee consists of at least three members;
the non-independent director is not currently an executive officer, employee, or an immediate family member of an executive officer or employee;
the board, under exceptional and limited circumstances, determines that the individual’s membership is required by the best interests of the issuer and its stockholders; and
the non-independent director serves for no longer than two years.

A smaller reporting company relying on the exception must provide certain disclosures required by NYSE MKT listing standards in the proxy statement for the next annual meeting following the determination (or annual report on Form 10-K if a proxy statement is not required), and any disclosure required by Instruction 1 to Item 407(a) of Regulation S-K regarding reliance on the exception.

Exemptions. The new compensation committee listing standards will not apply to the following issuers that are exempt from the NYSE MKT’s current compensation committee listing standards:

controlled companies (i.e., issuers where more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or another issuer);
limited partnerships (for example, MLPs);
companies in bankruptcy;
closed-end and open-end funds registered under the 1940 Act;
asset-backed issuers and other passive business organizations (for example, royalty trusts);
derivatives and special purpose securities; and
issuers whose only listed equity security is preferred stock.

Smaller reporting companies are exempt from the new enhanced compensation committee independence and consideration of adviser independence standards. However, these issuers are subject to the other new standards. An issuer that ceases to qualify as a smaller reporting company will have:

six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to comply with the consideration of adviser independence standard;
six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have one member of its compensation committee satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard;
nine months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have a majority of its compensation committee members satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard; and
12 months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to have a compensation committee consisting entirely of members that satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standard.¹¹

Foreign private issuers may seek an exemption on the basis that they follow home country practice if they comply with the requirements of Section 110 of the Guide.

Transition periods for newly-listed issuers. The current transition periods available to newly-listed issuers apply to the new compensation committee listing standards. Thus, an issuer listing in connection with its IPO must have one independent compensation committee member at the time of listing, a majority of independent members within 90 days of listing, and a fully independent compensation committee within one year of listing.

Click here to read about practical considerations to consider in response to the new compensation committee listing standards.

NASDAQ Compensation Committee Listing Rules

Compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding its advisers. A compensation committee must have the following authority and responsibilities:

the authority, in its sole discretion, to retain or obtain the advice of a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser (collectively referred to throughout the discussion of NASDAQ’s new listing standards as advisers);
the direct responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the work of any adviser retained by the committee;
the issuer must provide for appropriate funding (as determined by the committee) for the payment of reasonable compensation to any adviser retained by the committee; and
the responsibility to conduct an independence assessment before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser to the committee (as discussed in more detail below under “Assessment of adviser independence”).

For those issuers without a standing compensation committee, until the requirement to have a standing compensation committee is effective (as discussed in more detail below under “Compensation committee composition and independence”) these requirements will apply to the independent directors who determine, or recommend to the board to determine, the compensation of executive officers.

Issuers will need to consider under the corporate law of the state of their incorporation whether to grant by July 1, 2013 the authority and responsibilities discussed above through a charter, board resolution or other board action.

The new authority and responsibilities regarding advisers do not:

require the compensation committee to implement or follow its advisers’ advice or recommendations; or
affect the ability or obligation of the compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfilling its duties.

the provision of other services to the issuer by the adviser’s employer;
the amount of fees received from the issuer by the adviser’s employer, as a percentage of the employer’s total revenue;
the policies and procedures of the adviser’s employer that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest;
any business or personal relationship between the adviser and a compensation committee member;
any issuer stock owned by the adviser (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, it interprets this to include stock owned by the adviser’s immediate family members); and
any business or personal relationship between either the adviser or the adviser’s employer and an issuer’s executive officer (as the SEC noted in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, this would include, for example, situations where an issuer’s CEO and the adviser have a familial relationship or where the CEO and the adviser or the adviser’s employer are business partners).

These factors are considerations for the compensation committee rather than bright-line standards. After considering the six independence factors, compensation committees may select or receive advice from any adviser they prefer, even those that are not independent.¹²

Compensation committees must conduct the independence assessment for any adviser (including outside legal counsel) that the committee selects or receives advice from, other than:

in-house legal counsel; and
any adviser whose role is limited to:
- consulting on any broad-based plan that does not discriminate in scope, terms, or operation, in favor of executive officers or directors of the issuer, and that is available generally to all salaried employees; or
- providing information that either is not customized for a particular issuer or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the adviser and about which the adviser does not provide advice.

In approving the new listing rules, the SEC noted its expectation that the independence assessment would be conducted at least annually.

Compensation committee composition and independence. NASDAQ’s current listing rules require that an issuer’s executive officer compensation must be determined, or recommended to the board for determination, either by:

a compensation committee comprised solely of independent directors; or
independent directors constituting a majority of the board’s independent directors in a vote in which only independent directors participate.

NASDAQ eliminated the second alternative and by the relevant 2014 compliance date issuers, including smaller reporting companies (generally issuers with less than $75 million of public equity float), must have a standing compensation committee comprised of at least two members. Each compensation committee member must be an independent director (as defined in current Listing Rule 5605(a)(2)), and boards are required to make an affirmative determination that no independent director has a relationship that, in the board’s opinion, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.

In addition to satisfying the requirement that each compensation committee member be an independent director, the new rules provide that:

each member is prohibited from accepting directly or indirectly any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee from the issuer or any of its subsidiaries; and
the board must consider whether a compensation committee member is affiliated with the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer to determine whether any affiliation would impair the member’s judgment as a member of the compensation committee.

These independence factors do not include any specific numerical or materiality tests. In approving the listing rules, the SEC confirmed that, despite any explicit statement by NASDAQ on the matter, a single factor could disqualify a director from being independent under the enhanced compensation committee independence rules.

Although director fees are not an explicit factor to be considered in compensation committee independence determinations, NASDAQ noted that as boards must make an affirmative independence determination that each independent director has no relationship that would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director the board could, if appropriate, consider director fees in that context.¹³

The enhanced independence rules adopt the same bright-line prohibition against compensatory fees applicable to audit committees. The prohibition does not include a “look-back” period and, therefore, would apply only during a director’s service on the compensation committee. “Compensatory fees” do not include:

fees received for board or board committee service; or
the receipt of fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement plan, including deferred compensation, for prior service with the issuer (provided that the compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service).

Unlike the prohibition regarding compensatory fees, the rules do not impose a bright-line prohibition on affiliation, but rather impose a requirement to consider such affiliations when making a compensation committee independence determination. Although a board may conclude differently based on the specific facts and circumstances, NASDAQ does not believe ownership of issuer stock by itself, or possession of a controlling interest through ownership of issuer stock by itself, precludes a board from finding that it is appropriate for a director (for example, as a representative of a significant stockholder) to serve on the compensation committee. The board will not be required to apply a “look-back” period and, therefore, need consider affiliation only with respect to relationships that occur during a director’s service on the compensation committee.

Issuers, including smaller reporting companies, may rely on the current exception that allows one non-independent director to serve on the compensation committee under exceptional and limited circumstances, even for a director who fails the new enhanced compensation committee independence rules. Under this exception, one non-independent director may be appointed to the compensation committee if:

the committee consists of at least three members;
the non-independent director is not currently an executive officer, employee, or a family member of an executive officer;
the board, under exceptional and limited circumstances, determines that the individual’s membership is required by the best interests of the issuer and its stockholders;
the non-independent director serves for no longer than two years; and
the issuer provides certain disclosures required by the listing rules either on its website or in the proxy statement for the next annual meeting following the determination (or annual report if a proxy statement is not required), and the disclosures required by Instruction 1 to Item 407(a) of Regulation S-K regarding reliance on the exception.

If an issuer, including a smaller reporting company, fails to comply with the compensation committee composition requirements due to one vacancy, or one compensation committee member ceases to be independent for reasons beyond that member’s reasonable control, the issuer must regain compliance by the earlier of (1) its next annual stockholder meeting or (2) one year from the event that caused the non-compliance. If the annual stockholder meeting occurs within 180 days after the event causing the non-compliance, the issuer would instead have 180 days from the event to regain compliance. An issuer relying on the cure period must provide notice to NASDAQ immediately upon learning of the event or circumstances that caused the non-compliance.

Committee charter requirements. Issuers must certify that they have adopted a formal written compensation committee charter and that the compensation committee will review and reassess the adequacy of the charter on an annual basis.¹⁴ The charter must specify:

the scope of the committee’s responsibilities and how it carries out those responsibilities, including structure, processes and membership requirements;
the committee’s responsibility for determining, or recommending to the board for determination, the compensation of the issuer’s executive officers;
that the CEO may not be present during voting or deliberations by the committee on his or her compensation; and
the specific committee authority and responsibilities discussed above under “Compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding its advisers.”

Smaller reporting companies must adopt either a formal written compensation committee charter or a board resolution that specifies only the matters in the first three bullets above. These issuers are not required to specify the compensation committee authority and responsibilities set forth in the fourth bullet above or to certify that they will review and reassess the adequacy of the charter or board resolution on an annual basis.

Exemptions. The new listing rules do not apply to the following issuers that are exempt from NASDAQ’s current compensation-related listing rules:

asset-backed issuers and other passive issuers;
cooperatives;
limited partnerships (for example, MLPs);
management investment companies registered under the 1940 Act; and
controlled companies (i.e., issuers where more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group or another company).

Smaller reporting companies are exempt from the new compensation committee listing rules, except as follows:

they must have (and certify that they have and will continue to have) a formal compensation committee comprised of at least two independent members based on the current independent director definition in Listing Rule 5605(a)(2), but not the enhanced compensation committee independence standards; and
they must certify that they have adopted a formal written compensation committee charter or board resolution as discussed above under “Committee charter requirements."

An issuer that ceases to qualify as a smaller reporting company will have six months from the date it ceases to be a smaller reporting company to:

comply with the committee authority and responsibilities standards; and
certify to NASDAQ that it (1) has adopted a formal written compensation committee charter, including all of the matters specified above under “Committee charter requirements,” and (2) has, or will within the required phase-in schedule,¹⁵ comply with the enhanced compensation committee independence standards.

Foreign private issuers that follow their home country practice are exempt from the new listing rules provided that they comply with the disclosure requirements in current Listing Rule 5615(a)(3). In addition, foreign private issuers that follow their home country practice in lieu of having an independent compensation committee as required by NASDAQ listing rules must disclose in their annual reports filed with the SEC the reasons why they do not have an independent compensation committee.

Certification. Issuers must certify to NASDAQ within 30 days after the final implementation deadline applicable to them, on a form to be provided by NASDAQ, that they have complied with the new compensation committee listing rules. Although smaller reporting companies, foreign private issuers and controlled companies are exempt from some or all of the compensation committee listing standards, based on a sample certification form provided by NASDAQ in one of its rule filings these issuers would need to complete and file the required certification form.¹⁶

Transition periods for IPO issuers. Although issuers listing in connection with their IPO are subject to the new rules, they can phase-in compliance with the compensation committee composition requirements in accordance with current phase-in schedules. Thus, these issuers must have one independent compensation committee member at listing, a majority of independent members within 90 days of listing and a fully independent committee within one year of listing.

Practical Considerations

NYSE-, NYSE MKT- and NASDAQ-listed issuers and their boards and compensation committees that are subject to the listing standards should consider the following matters. In addition to the following, issuers should not forget to conduct a review of “conflicts of interest” with compensation consultants who had any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation (subject to certain exceptions). A new SEC rule requires any such conflicts of interest to be disclosed in proxy statements for meetings involving the election of directors held on or after January 1, 2013.¹⁷ As part of this process, issuers should update their director and officer questionnaire to solicit information about the existence of business or personal relationships with compensation consultants and the consultants’ employers and establish policies and procedures for collecting and analyzing information about compensation consultants to determine whether a conflict of interest exists.

By July 1, 2013:

Grant required compensation committee authority and responsibilities regarding advisers.
- NASDAQ- and NYSE MKT-listed issuers should consider under the corporate law of the state of their incorporation whether to grant the new authority and responsibilities to the compensation committee (or, in lieu of such a committee, the independent directors who determine or recommend executive compensation) through a committee charter amendment, board resolution or other board action. Although the authority and responsibilities must be granted by July 1, 2013, NASDAQ-listed issuers are not required to include these matters in their compensation committee charter until 2014 (as discussed below). NYSE MKT-listed issuers are not required to have a compensation committee charter, but must determine how best to grant the required authority and responsibilities by July 1, 2013. Although not required until 2014, NASDAQ-listed issuers with existing compensation committee charters may determine it is best to amend their charters by July 1, 2013 to grant the required authority and responsibilities instead of relying on a board resolution or other board action.
- NYSE-listed issuers should review their compensation committee charters and amend as necessary to grant the new authority and responsibilities.
Conduct adviser independence assessment.
- Discuss the new listing standards with each existing and potential adviser to the compensation committee, even those advisers retained by management or the issuer, to determine whether an independence assessment is required.
- As specifically noted by the SEC in its adopting release for Rule 10C-1, establish policies and procedures for collecting and analyzing information about advisers before the compensation committee can select or receive advice from those advisers. Steps issuers could take include (1) collecting information internally on the services provided by advisers, including identifying the individual advisers that perform services for the issuer and such advisers’ employers, and the fees paid for such services, (2) having the advisers complete a questionnaire or requesting specific representations and covenants in the adviser engagement letter to solicit the information necessary for the compensation committee to consider the enumerated factors set forth in the listing standards and any other factors deemed relevant to the compensation committee, and (3) updating the director and officer questionnaire to determine the existence of any business or personal relationship with any adviser to the compensation committee or such adviser’s employer. Ensure that any policies and procedures developed are consistent with the compensation committee charter and other issuer procedures, and that they provide that the required independence assessment is conducted prior to selecting or receiving advice from new advisers and at least annually for existing advisers.
- For existing advisers to the compensation committee where an independence assessment is required, assess their independence and then schedule the next assessment for that adviser at least annually thereafter. As part of this exercise, boards of NYSE- and NYSE MKT-listed issuers should identify and consider any factors in addition to the six specified factors that would be relevant to an adviser’s independence from management. The listing standards are clear that advisers are not required to be independent if the independence assessment is conducted before selecting or receiving advice from an adviser. However, compensation committees may want to consider whether to adopt a policy that guides their actions if an adviser is not independent.

By the earlier of the first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014:

Evaluate compliance with enhanced compensation committee independence standards.
- Update the director and officer questionnaire to address the enhanced compensation committee independence standards.
- Evaluate the independence of compensation committee members to ensure they satisfy the enhanced compensation committee independence standards. Except for NASDAQ’s absolute prohibition on compensatory fees from the issuer or its subsidiaries, the enhanced independence standards do not impose a prohibition on committee membership if the enumerated independence factors are not satisfied. However, as stockholders and proxy advisory firms may be concerned if any factor is not satisfied boards should carefully consider how they will respond if a member does not satisfy the enumerated independence factors. Issuers may choose to conduct such an evaluation in 2013, and develop contingency plans in the event one or more of the existing compensation committee members would not be deemed independent under the enhanced independence standards (for example, in the case of a NASDAQ-listed issuer if a member receives any compensatory fees from the issuer or its subsidiaries). In such case, issuers should consider updating their 2013 director and officer questionnaire to include, for compensation committee members, questions that solicit the information that will enable the board to conduct an evaluation under the enhanced independence standards.
Establish a compensation committee. For NASDAQ-listed issuers without a formal compensation committee, establish a committee in accordance with the new listing rules.
Adopt a compensation committee charter. For NASDAQ-listed issuers, adopt a compensation committee charter that complies with the new charter standards or ensure that the existing compensation committee charter complies with the new charter standards.

Provide compliance certification. NASDAQ-listed issuers must certify to NASDAQ within 30 days after the final implementation deadline applicable to them, on a form to be provided by NASDAQ, that they have complied with the new compensation committee listing rules.

_{1. New York Stock Exchange LLC, Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 3, and Order Granting Accelerated Approval for Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1 and 3, to Amend the Listing Rules for Compensation Committees to Comply with Securities Exchange Act Rule 10C-1 and Make Other Related Changes, Release No. 34-68639 (Jan. 11, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 4570 (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-22/pdf/2013-01106.pdf. The amendments impact Sections 303A.00, 303A.02(a) and 303A.05 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual (Manual). The text of the amended listing standards is included in Exhibit 5 to this NYSE rule filing.}

_{2. NYSE MKT LLC, Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 3, and Order Granting Accelerated Approval for Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1 and 3, to Amend the Listing Rules for Compensation Committees to Comply with Securities Exchange Act Rule 10C-1 and Make Other Related Changes, Release No. 34-68637 (Jan. 11, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 4537 (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-22/pdf/2013-01104.pdf. The amendments impact Sections 110, 801(h), 803A and 805 of the NYSE MKT Company Guide (Guide). The text of the amended listing standards is included in Exhibit 5 to this NYSE MKT rule filing.}

_{3. The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, Notice of Filing of Amendment Nos. 1 and 2, and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 to Amend the Listing Rules for Compensation Committees to Comply with Rule 10C-1 under the Act and Make Other Related Changes, Release No. 34-68640 (Jan. 11, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-22/pdf/2013-01107.pdf. The amendments impact compensation committee- and corporate governance-related Listing Rules 5605(d) and 5615, and add new Listing Rule 5605A. The amendments also include conforming amendments to audit and nominations committee-related Listing Rules 5605(c) and 5605(e)(3) and corrections of typographical errors in other listing rules. The text of the amended listing rules is included in Exhibit 5 to this NASDAQ rule filing.}

_{4. Please see our client alert dated October 22, 2012 for a discussion of the listing standard amendments as originally proposed, NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ Propose Amendments to Compensation Committee Listing Standards.}

_{5. Issuers should remember that pursuant to new Item 407(e)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-K their proxy statements for meetings involving the election of directors held on or after January 1, 2013 must include disclosure of any “conflict of interest” involving compensation consultants (but not other advisers such as lawyers) who had any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation (subject to certain exceptions). “Conflict of interest” is not defined, but to determine whether a conflict of interest exists, issuers should use the factors set out in Exchange Act Rule 10C-1(b)(4) relating to adviser independence, which are the same six factors identified in the new NYSE standards.}

_{6. See Letter from Janet McGinness, Exec. Vice Pres., Corp. Sec’y & Gen. Counsel, NYSE Markets, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 10, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2012-49/nyse201249-8.pdf.}

_{7. These issuers would also need to update their compensation committee charters to reflect these matters.}

_{8. For the remainder of the discussion of the NYSE MKT’s new listing standards, references to compensation committee are meant to refer to an issuer’s independent directors as a group where the issuer does not have a compensation committee, but instead relies on its independent directors to determine, or recommend to the board for determination, executive officer compensation.}

_{9. Issuers should remember that pursuant to new Item 407(e)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-K their proxy statements for meetings involving the election of directors held on or after January 1, 2013 must include disclosure of any “conflict of interest” involving compensation consultants (but not other advisers such as lawyers) who had any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation (subject to certain exceptions). “Conflict of interest” is not defined, but to determine whether a conflict of interest exists, issuers should use the factors set out in Exchange Act Rule 10C-1(b)(4) relating to adviser independence, which are the same six factors identified in the new NYSE MKT standards.}

_{10. See Letter from Janet McGinness, Exec. Vice Pres., Corp. Sec’y & Gen. Counsel, NYSE Markets, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 10, 2013), available at http://sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2012-49/nyse201249-8.pdf. Although no comments were submitted on the NYSE MKT’s proposed listing standards, comments were submitted on the NYSE’s and NYSE Arca’s proposed listing standards. In response to these comments, NYSE Euronext (the parent company of NYSE, NYSE MKT and NYSE Arca) issued one response letter that addressed the comments on behalf of all NYSE exchanges, including NYSE MKT, as the comments raised are in substance applicable to all three proposals.}

_{11. Any such issuer that does not have a compensation committee must comply with this transition requirement with respect to all of its independent directors as a group.}

_{12. Issuers should remember that pursuant to new Item 407(e)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-K their proxy statements for meetings involving the election of directors held on or after January 1, 2013 must include disclosure of any “conflict of interest” involving compensation consultants (but not other advisers such as lawyers) who had any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation (subject to certain exceptions). “Conflict of interest” is not defined, but to determine whether a conflict of interest exists, issuers should use the factors set out in Exchange Act Rule 10C-1(b)(4) relating to adviser independence, which are the same six factors identified in the new NASDAQ rules.}

_{13. See Letter from Erika J. Moore, Assoc. Gen. Counsel., NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-NASDAQ-2012-109/NASDAQ2012109-9.pdf.}

_{14. NASDAQ also proposed, and the SEC approved, amendments to NASDAQ’s audit committee listing rules that require listed issuers to proactively certify that the audit committee “will review and reassess” the adequacy of the audit committee charter on an annual basis. Current listing rules require the certification to provide that the audit committee “has reviewed and reassessed” the adequacy of the audit committee’s charter on an annual basis. NASDAQ noted that this change is consistent with its current interpretation of the audit committee charter requirements and will harmonize the audit committee charter requirements with the new compensation committee charter requirements.}

_{15. A smaller reporting company that loses that status must comply with the enhanced compensation committee independence requirements as follows: (1) one member in compliance within six months from the date smaller reporting company status is lost, (2) a majority in compliance within nine months from the date smaller reporting company status is lost and (3) all members in compliance within one year from the date smaller reporting company status is lost.}

_{16. See Exhibit 3 to this NASDAQ rule filing for the form of compensation committee certification NASDAQ intends to use.}

_{17. For more information on this SEC disclosure requirement, please see our client alert dated July 9, 2012, SEC Adopts Rules Implementing Dodd-Frank Requirements for Compensation Committees and Compensation Advisers.}